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1. "No impartial observer could criticize this Court for hindering the progress of
the war on drugs. On the contrary, decisions like the one the Court makes today will
support the conclusion that this Court has become a loyal foot soldier in the Executive's
fight against crime." California v. Acevedo, Ill S. Ct. 1982, 2002 (1991) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
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I. INTRODUCTION
The automobile captured the hearts of Americans in the 1920s.1
Since then the criminal justice system has struggled with how to apply
the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution to the search of automobiles
or any containers found within them. On one hand, many Americans
spend much of their time in automobiles, and many consider their cars
to be hallmarks of their individuality. Next to ownership of a home,
an automobile is the largest single asset held by most Americans.' Many
citizens conduct either part or all of their trade or business from their
automobile. Under this realist view, the Fourth Amendment should
afford to automobiles the same degree of protection which it provides
for buildings. On the other hand, automobiles create a practical dif-
ficulty for the agents of law enforcement. The rapid and unpredictable
mobility of the automobile gives a wrong-doer an easy means to evade
capture and avoid police searches. Just like many Americans who con-
duct their trade or business from their automobile, criminals can sim-
ilarly be expected to use their automobiles in furtherance of their
crimes.4 Under this pragmatist view, many wrong-doers would escape
the authority of police officers if the Fourth Amendment required law
enforcement agents to conduct searches of automobiles in the same
manner as searches of buildings.
Over the course of several years, the Supreme Court adopted an
intermediate, compromise approach where most of the automobile could
be lawfully searched without a warrant pursuant to the "automobile
exception.'" However, the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment
still protected some areas within the automobile.6 Despite this hard-
2. Though the automobile was first introduced to the American public before the
turn of the century, the automobile market boomed in the 1920s. The total number of
registered automobiles, merely eight thousand in 1900, increased from nine million in
1920 to nearly twenty.seven million in 1929 (one motor vehicle per every four and a
half people). By the mid-1920s, automobile manufacturing was the largest American
industry in value of product and was third in value of exports. See John B. Rae, The
American Automobile 238 (Tables 6 and 7) (1965); James J. Flink, The Car Culture
140-41 (1975).
3. See Diane Harris, How You Can Live Better, Money, Oct. 1991. 132. 137.
Eighty-six percent of Americans have equity in their automobiles. The median value is
$4,416. Meanwhile, sixty-four percent of Americans have home equity. The median equity
in houses is $43,070.
4. See Kenneth M. Murchison, Prohibition and the Fourth Amendment: A New
Look at Some Old Cases, 73 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 471, 496-97 (1982) (hereinafter
Murchisonl.
5. See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982); Carroll
v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S. Ct. 280 (1925).
6. Containers such as packages, luggage, and bags located in the automobile were
immune from a warrantless search. See, e.g., Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 99 S.
1206 [Vol. 52
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fought compromise, the Justice Department advocated a uniform rule
which would allow police officers to search, without a search warrant,
both the entire car and any containers within.7 The Supreme Court
agreed and so ruled in California v. Acevedo.'
This comment will examine the Acevedo decision. It will show that
the Supreme Court decided the case incorrectly and unwisely overturned
Arkansas v. SandersO and United States v. Chadwick.'0 Acevedo cannot
be reconciled with a Fourth Amendment designed to protect an indi-
vidual's privacy from unwarranted state searches. Part II will provide
an overview of the "automobile exception" jurisprudence as pronounced
by the United States Supreme Court. Part III will explain the history
and rationale of Acevedo. Part IV will then provide a critical analysis
of the Acevedo decision. The analysis will point out many problems
with the Court's reasoning, problems of policy, and the long-term
problems which will develop from the Court's present dereliction of
the Bill of Rights. A brief look at the criminal justice system of the
now-defunct Soviet Union will be used to illustrate the inherent failure
and danger of broad police powers." Part V will conclude that the
Supreme Court of Louisiana, as well as the highest courts of other
states, should not follow the reasoning of the United States Supreme
Court in Acevedo. Instead, the Louisiana Supreme Court should decide
that the Declaration of Rights in the Louisiana Constitution requires
Ct. 2586 (1979); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. I, 97 S. Ct. 2476 (1977). To a
lesser extent the trunk of the car was also protected since it was not subject to a
warrantless search incident to an arrest. See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454,
101 S. Ct. 2860 (1981).
7. See, e.g., United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 16, 97 S. Ct. 2476, 2486
(1977) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[lit is deeply distressing that the Department of Justice,
whose mission is to protect the constitutional liberties of the people of the United States,
should even appear to be seeking to subvert them by extreme and dubious legal argu-
ments.").
8. 111 S. Ct. 1982 (1991).
9. 442 U.S. 753, 99 S. Ct. 2586.
10. 433 U.S. 1, 97 S. Ct. 2476.
11. The use of the Soviet Union as an example is not designed to play upon patriotic
emotions. Many other states throughout the world with differing political, economic,
and social systems could have been used as examples. However, the recent dissolution
of the Soviet Union offers a very fresh and clear illustration of the dangers of a state
which emphasized strong police power over its citizens. It may be argued that the abuses
which occurred in the Soviet Union could not happen in the United States because we
are not a communist country, and our police are controlled by a unique American ethic
to "do the right thing." Unfortunately, the abuses of excessive police power have infected
numerous states of all backgrounds-even democracies and nations who also felt they
had unique ethical restraints. Certainly, functioning democracy can retard the growth of
police power, but once the police are systemically freed of constitutional limits, the result
is analogous to a police state.
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a law enforcement officer to get a warrant before searching a container
found within the trunk of an automobile.
11. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND TO THE AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION
A. The Fourth Amendment
All searches by government agents must comport with the require-
ments of the Fourth Amendment, which reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and partic-
ularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized. 2
Any evidence which is obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment
is subject to the exclusionary rule and may not be used against the
individual whose constitutional rights were violated. 3 Therefore, the
precise interpretation and application of the Fourth Amendment by the
courts is of paramount importance to the law enforcement agent as
well as those accused of committing crimes. The police officer often
makes decisions and acts under stressful conditions. He therefore needs
a clear rule of thumb regarding the applicability of the Fourth Amend-
ment. The individual citizen demands a rule which provides him the
largest possible amount of liberty; and, society-at-large relies upon the
effective operation of the criminal justice system to remove criminals
from the streets of America.
The courts have faced the delicate task of striking a fair balance
between the rights of the individual and the welfare of society. If the
police were to have carte blanche authority to ignore individual rights,
the result would be a police state. On the other hand, if the police
are constrained from any impingement upon individual rights, the result
would be anarchy.' 4 Not surprisingly, the jurisprudence on the Fourth
Amendment has reflected a heated, emotional debate. Moreover, searches
and seizures of automobiles have been even more problematic than
other classes of searches.'" Therefore, one must review the history and
origins of the Fourth Amendment to glean the theory and philosophy
behind the search and seizure jurisprudence; only then will one have
12. U.S. Const. amend. IV.
13. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684 (1961); Weeks v. United States,
232 U.S. 383, 34 S. Ct. 341 (1914).
14. Rex D. Davis, Federal Searches and Seizures vii-viii (1964).
15. Frank W. Miller, et al., The Police Function 317 (5th ed. 1991).
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the basis needed to construct a thoughtful framework through which
to critique the Court's search and seizure jurisprudence.
B. Early British Search and Seizure
The American laws concerning search and seizure were greatly in-
fluenced by English laws and customs. 16 Early British common law did
not make use of any search warrant, but gradually, search warrants
came into use by the British constables. Initially, the use of warrants
was restricted to the search for stolen goods,' 7 but over time the warrant
was used to recover virtually any evidence.' The Secretary of State
issued so-called "general warrants"' 9 which directed the constable to
search for and seize any books or libelous writings-at any time and
any place. 0 By the mid-eighteenth century, general warrants allowed
the constable to conduct virtually unlimited searches and seizures of
any person, property, or home.'
The widespread use of general warrants led to so many violations
of personal rights that the English courts, in response to widespread
public discontent, had to circumscribe their issuance.Y In 1765, Lord
Camden ruled that the use of general warrants "in the case of seditious
libel is illegal and void." 2 He wrote: "The great end for which men
entered into society was to secure their property. That right is preserved
sacred and incommunicable in all instances where it has not been taken
away or abridged by some public law for the good of the whole."
2
'
16. John C. Klotter & Jacqueline R. Kanovitz, Constitutional Law 151-52 (5th ed.
1985) [hereinafter Klotter].
17. See, e.g., People v. Kempner, 101 N.E. 794, 795-96 (N.Y. 1913).
18. The general warrants were originated by the Star Chamber. See, e.g., Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 629, 6 S. Ct. 524, 531 (1886).
19. "General warrant" means a warrant which does not specify the place, thing,
or person to be searched or seized; see Frey v. State, 237 A.2d 774, 779 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1968). At that time, the Secretary of State was "the keeper of the King's signet
wherewith the King's Private letters are signed." Entick v. Carrington and Three Other
King's Messengers, 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 816 (1765).
20. Edward C. Fisher, Search and Seizure 2-3 (1970) [hereinafter Fisher). The term
"libelous" included any writing critical of the King or of others in high places.
21. Klotter, supra note 16, at 152.
22. Fisher, supra note 20, at 3.
23. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 629, 6 S. Ct. 524, 532 (1886) (citing
Entick, 95 Eng. Rep. 807). Lord Camden was well-known in the colonies and England
as a vocal supporter of the colonies' right to representation in Parliament. In his honor,
cities were named after him in New Jersey and South Carolina.
24. Id. at 627, 6 S. Ct. at 530. The primary protection for this property right was
the common law tort of trespass. Lord Camden explained:
By the laws of England, every invasion of private property, be it ever so
minute, is a trespass. No man may set his foot upon my ground without my
19921 NOTES 1209
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He then concluded that neither positive law nor common law justified
the use of general warrants. Therefore, the constable was liable for
trespass.
Lord Camden's opinion was "applauded by the lovers of liberty
in the colonies'"'" as well as in England. American statesmen of both
the revolutionary and formative periods of the United States were well
aware of the opinion and regarded it "as the true and ultimate ex-
pression of constitutional law." 26 Indeed, in Boyd v. United States,27
Justice Bradley asserted that the propositions of Lord Camden's opinion
were foremost in the minds of the drafters of the Fourth Amendment
and were sufficiently explanatory of what the drafters meant by un-
reasonable searches and seizures.28 The Court pointed out that:
The principles laid down in [Lord Camden's] opinion affect the
very essence of constitutional liberty and security .... [Tjhey
apply to all invasions on the part of the government and its
employees of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies
of life. It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging
of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offense; but
it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security,
personal liberty, and private property, where that right has never
been forfeited by his conviction of some public offense .... 29
The year following Lord Camden's opinion, the English Parliament
considered resolutions to condemn the general warrants. During the
debates, William Pitt, the Earl of Chatham, argued: "The poorest man
may, in his cottage, bid defiance to all the forces of the Crown. It
may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow through it; the
storm may enter; the rain may enter; but the King of England may
not enter; all his force dares not cross the threshold of the ruined
tenement."130 The resolutions passed in April, 1766.
C. Search and Seizure in the American Colonies
Across the Atlantic in the American colonies, the general warrants,
labeled "writs of assistance," were facing a similar challenge. The writs
license, but he is liable to an action, though the damage be nothing .... If
he admits the fact, he is bound to show, by way of justification, that some
positive law has justified or excused him.... If no such excuse can be found
or produced ... the plaintiff must have judgment.
Id., 6 S. Ct. at 530.
25. Id. at 626, 6 S. Ct. at 530.
26. Id., 6 S. Ct. at 530.
27. 116 U.S. 616, 6 S. Ct. 524 (1886).
28. Id. at 626-27, 6 S. Ct. at 530.
29. Id. at 630, 6 S. Ct. at 532.
30. See, e.g., Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 307, 78 S. Ct. 1190, 1195
(1958); Fisher, supra note 20, at 3; The Oxford Dictionary of Quotations 373 (3d. ed.
1979).
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of assistance originally arose in Massachusetts to aid the revenue of-
ficers' war upon smuggling.' The writs of assistance allowed the King's
revenue officers to authorize the constable to search any ship, cellar,
warehouse, or other place where the constable suspected he could find
smuggled goods or goods on which duty had not been paid. The writs
of assistance also allowed the constable to arrest any person suspected
of complicity in smuggling or duty evasion.32 In 1760, the British Crown
began in earnest to stifle the highly profitable but illegal smuggling
trade. In furtherance of its aim, the Crown issued an avalanche of
writs of assistance resulting in large scale seizures of illicit cargoes in
Boston.33 Immediately, the smugglers and other notable citizens, many
of whom were to become America's founding fathers, erupted in protest.
In February of 1761, a large group of merchants assembled in a Boston
courthouse and denounced the writs of assistance. James Otis called
the writs "the worst instrument of arbitrary power, the most destructive
of English liberty and the fundamental principles of law, that ever was
found in an English law book. . . . [because they placed] the liberty
of every man in the hands of every petty officer." '34 According to John
Adams: "Every man of a crowded audience appeared to me to go
away, as I did, ready to take arms against writs of assistance. Then
and there was the first scene of the first act of opposition to the
arbitrary claims of Great Britain. Then and there the child Independence
was born."" Certainly the founding fathers did not forget the arguments
made in that Boston courtroom or the arguments by Lord Camden
and William Pitt.
Fifteen years later the American colonies declared their independence
from England. Curiously, nothing was written in the Declaration of
Independence (1776) about searches, seizures or warrants. This omission
does not mean that the drafters did not consider the issue worthy.
Rather, either the drafters did not wish to mention the writs of assistance
due to the implicit linkage to smuggling, or the drafters felt that all
Englishmen and colonists already tacitly accepted the citizen's right to
be free of such writs. 36 The Articles of Confederation (1781), the
Northwest Ordinance (1787), and the original Constitution (1787) also
omitted the subject."
31. John C. Miller, Origins of the American Revolution 46-47 (1959) [hereinafter
Miller].
32. Fisher, supra note 20, at 4.
33. Miller, supra note 31, at 46.
34. Boyd v. United States. 116 U.S. 616, 625, 6 S. Ct. 524, 529 (1886); 2 The
Works of John Adams 523-24 (1856).
35. 10 The Works of John Adams 24748 (1856).
36. Fisher, supra note 20, at 7 n.20. One should keep in mind that the resolutions
condemning general warrants had been passed in England in 1766, ten years before the
Declaration of Independence.
37. Fisher, supra note 20, at 8. The original Constitution did not address the rights
1992] 1211
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However, searches and seizures were mentioned in two dominant
state Bills of Rights. The Virginia Bill of Rights, adopted June 12,
1776, stated:
That general warrants, whereby an officer or messenger may
be commanded to search suspected places without evidence of
a fact committed, or to seize any person or persons not named,
or whose offense is not particularly described and supported
by evidence, are grievous and oppressive, and ought not to be
granted.3"
The Virginia Bill of Rights plainly adopted a minimalist approach which
discouraged the use of only pure general warrants. On the other hand,
the Massachusetts Bill of Rights, adopted in 1780, stated: "Every subject
has a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches, and seizures,
of his person, his houses, his papers, and all his possessions .... And
no warrant ought to be issued but in cases, and with the formalities
prescribed by the laws." 39 The Massachusetts Bill of Rights adopted a
much broader scope of protection from searches and seizures. It ex-
pressly supplied a right "to be secure'' rather than a mere prohibition
of general warrants. No doubt the drafters of the Fourth Amendment
carefully scrutinized the pertinent provisions in the Massachusetts and
Virginia Bills of Rights since those two states were dominant in the
political affairs of the young nation.4 Between the two, however, the
Fourth Amendment more clearly reflects the language of the Massa-
chusetts Bill of Rights. As Justice Frankfurter suggested, "This is clear
proof that Congress meant to give wide, and not limited, scope to this
protection against police intrusion." '4'
Indeed, the Supreme Court has historically viewed the Fourth
Amendment as a broad guardian of an individual's right to privacy.42
of the citizens to protection from certain searches or seizures because the Constitutional
Convention was concerned with strengthening the government, not with putting limits
on the federal power. The delegates assumed that individual rights were accounted for
in the list of rights which most of the states had included in their basic law. However,
many of the powerful Anti-Federalists would not agree to support the Constitution unless
they were assured that the individual rights accepted by the various states would be
guaranteed by a national document. Thus, the Bill of Rights was born. See Joseph R.
Conlin, The American Past 157-58 (1984).
38. Virginia Bill of Rights, Item 10. See I Documents of American History 103
(Henry S. Commager & Milton Cantor eds., 10th ed. 1988).
39. Massachusetts Bill of Rights, Part the First, Art. XIV. See I Documents of
American History 107 (Henry S. Commager & Milton Cantor eds., 10th ed. 1988).
40. For example, until Andrew Jackson's election in 1828, the President of the
United States had always been a native of one of these two states.
41. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 158, 67 S. Ct. 1098, 1105 (1947) (Frank-
furter, J., dissenting).
42. See, e.g., Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 301, 87 S.
1212 [Vol. 52
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Initially, the Court interpreted the Fourth Amendment to apply mainly
to homes and the immediate effects of a person. More recently, the
scope of the Fourth Amendment was redefined in Katz v. United States,
which stated that the Fourth Amendment "protects people, not places."' 43
In summary, the unjust use of general warrants in England led to
the tyrannous use of writs of assistance in the American colonies. This
in turn contributed to the American Revolution and the creation of
the Fourth Amendment. Thus, the drafting of the Fourth Amendment
embodies a monumental moment in history where the relationship be-
tween the individual and his government was purposefully reshaped.
D. Evolution of the Automobile Exception: The Slippery Slope"
It is upon this history of conflict between the individual and the
government that the jurisprudence on the search of automobiles and
Ct. 1642, 1647 (1967) (Fourth Amendment is designed to protect against invasions of
the "sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life.") (quoting Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 630, 6 S. Ct. 524, 532 (1986)); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S.
293, 301, 87 S. Ct. 408, 413 (1966) (Fourth Amendment protects the "security a man
relies upon when he places himself or his property within a constitutionally protected
area, be it his home or his office, his hotel room or his automobile."); Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757, 767, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 1834 (1966) ( Fourth Amendment is
designed to protect "personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the
State."); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 1694 (1961) (Fourth
Amendment embodies "the right to privacy."); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582,
587, 66 S. Ct. 1256, 1258 (1945) (Fourth Amendment protects the individual's "right
to be let alone."); Go-Ban Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357, 51 S.
Ct. 153, 158 (1931) (Fourth Amendment "is general and forbids every search that is
unreasonable; it protects all, those suspected or known to be offenders as well as the
innocent.").
43. 389 U.S. 347, 351, 88 S. Ct. 507, 511 (1967). Katz set up a two-prong test to
determine whether the Fourth Amendment requirements are implicated. First, the accused
must have had a subjective expectation of privacy regarding the object or target of the
search or seizure. Second, the accused's expectation of privacy must be one which society-
at-large is prepared to accept as reasonable. Id. at 361, 88 S. Ct. at 516 (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
44. The "automobile exception" is also known as the "moving vehicle" rule, and
thus also applies to any highly mobile object such as a ship, boat, wagon, airplane, or
other object. See generally, California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 105 S. Ct. 2066 (1985)
(upheld warrantless search of a motor home); United States v. Nigro, 727 F.2d 100 (6th
Cir. 1984) (upheld warrantless search of a DC-6 aircraft); United States v. Lauchli, 724
F.2d 1279 (7th Cir. 1984) (upheld warrantless search of a fishing boat); United States
v. Wilson, 524 F.2d 595 (8th Cir. 1975) (upheld warrantless search of a duffel bag in
transit); United States v. Sigal, 500 F.2d 1118 (10th Cir. 1974) (upheld warrantless search
of airplane); United States v. Bozada, 473 F.2d 389 (8th Cir. 1973) (upheld warrantless
search of a trailer); United States v. Miller, 460 F.2d 582 (10th Cir. 1972) (upheld search
of mobile home); Lederer v. Tehan. 441 F.2d 293 (6th Cir. 1971) (upheld warrantless
search of U-Haul truck); United States v. Trayer, 701 F. Supp.* 250 (D. D.C. 1988)
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their contents was built. This comment will next outline the major cases
which have shaped the law on the constitutionality of searches of
automobiles and the containers found within.45 The reader should note
that the cases have often reflected the shifting balance of power between
those on the Court who champion personal rights and those who support
a strong police power.
1. The Seminal Case
Carroll v. United States,' 6 decided in 1925, was the first major case
which considered the constitutionality of automobile searches. The Court
held that a law enforcement officer may, without a warrant, search an
automobile and seize contraband liquor found during the search if the
officer has "reasonable or probable cause for believing that the au-
tomobile which he stops and seizes has contraband liquor therein which
is being illegally transported.' 47 On September 29, 1921, federal pro-
hibition agents working undercover in Grand Rapids, Michigan, ne-
gotiated with Carroll and his associates for the delivery of three cases
of illegal whiskey the following day. Carroll did not make the promised
delivery. Ten weeks later Carroll's Oldsmobile roadster passed prohi-
bition agents patrolling the road. The agents followed the car for several
miles and noticed that it was carrying an unusually heavy load. The
agents then stopped the roadster and searched the interior. The agents
slashed the upholstery of the seats and discovered sixty-eight bottles of
whiskey and gin hidden inside.4
In upholding the search, the Court first examined the statutory
authority upon which the agents relied. The Court pointed out that the
National Prohibition Act stated that no property rights could exist in
liquor. 49 At the same time, an act supplemental to the National Pro-
hibition Act penalized any agent who searched private property without
a warrant. s0 Unless the object searched was a private dwelling, the agent
was also required to have reasonable cause." Considering both of these
(upheld warrantless search of sleeping compartment in Amtrak train); People v. Mc-
Kinnon, 500 P.2d 1097 (Cal. 1972) (upheld warrantless search of a package being shipped
by freight); State v. Gamboa, 543 So. 2d 1129 (La. App. ist Cir. 1989) (upheld warrantless
search of pouch under bicycle seat); cf. Eckstein v. State, 526 N.E.2d 693 (Ind. 1988)
(upheld inventory search of a bicycle).
45. Although the history is lengthy, it is advisable that the reader be acquainted
with all the major cases in order to better understand the values which are at stake. It
is also appropriate to review the history of the automobile exception at this time, since
it appears that Acevedo has ended any meaningful discussion on the issue for the
foreseeable future.
46. 267 U.S. 132, 45 S. Ct. 280 (1925).
47. Id. at 156, 45 S. Ct. at 286.
48. Id. at 134-36, 45 S. Ct. at 281.
49. National Prohibition Act, ch. 85, tit. 2 § 25, 41 Stat. 305, 315 (1919) (repealed
1935).
50. Act of Nov. 23, 1921, ch. 134, § 6, 42 Stat. 222, 223-224 (repealed 1935).
51. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 143-44, 45 S. Ct. 280, 282 (1925).
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statutes, the Court concluded that Congress clearly intended to "make
a distinction between the necessity for a search warrant in the searching
of private dwellings and in that of automobiles and other road vehicles
in the enforcement of the Prohibition Act."' 2 The Court continued that
such a distinction by Congress would be constitutional as long as it
did not lead to unreasonable searches.
To determine what is an unreasonable search, the Court said: "The
Fourth Amendment is to be construed in the light of what was deemed
an unreasonable search and seizure when it was adopted, and in a
manner which will conserve public interests as well as the interests and
rights of individual citizens."" The Court noted that the first, second,
and fourth Congresses of the United States had passed statutes which
accepted a legal difference in the requirements for a search for illicit
goods concealed in a building and illicit goods concealed in a mobile
vessel, as the mobile vessel could quickly move the goods beyond the
reach of the warrant.14 Accordingly, these early statutes supported the
notion of a warrantless search of the mobile vessels. Since many of
the early congressmen were also influential persons during the ratifi-
cation of the Bill of Rights, presumably, the early statutes adopted by
the Congresses followed the intentions of the Fourth Amendment. There-
fore, the Court reasoned, a warrantless search of an automobile which
conceals and transports illegal goods was held to be reasonable within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment."
One must note, however, that the Court would only accept the
search as reasonable upon a showing of two circumstances. First, the
agent must have acted upon reasonable or probable cause to believe
that the automobile carried contraband. Second, the circumstances must
have indicated that it would have been impracticable to get a warrant.
Justice Taft warned that "[iIn cases where the securing of a warrant
is reasonably practicable, it must be used."' 6 Without a showing of
either circumstance, the law enforcement agent would be subject to
trespass actions.
It is also important to note that the Court decided Carroll in the
shadow of the 18th Amendment and during the extreme turmoil of
Prohibition." Even so, in a separate opinion Justice McReynolds cau-
51. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 143-44, 45 S. Ct. 280, 282 (1925).
52. Id. at 147, 45 S. Ct. at 283.
53. Id. at 149, 45 S. Ct. at 284.
54. Id. at 151, 45 S. Ct. at 284.
55. Id. at 153, 45 S. Ct. at 285.
56. Id. at 156, 45 S. Ct. at 286.
57. "[Tlhe manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the
importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof from the United States ... for
beverage purposes is hereby prohibited. The Congress and the several States shall have
concurrent power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation." U.S. Const. amend.
XVIII, §§ I and 2 (repealed 1933).
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tioned, "[t]he damnable character of the 'bootlegger's' business should
not close our eyes to the mischief which will surely follow any attempt
to destroy it by unwarranted methods." He then quoted Sir William
Scott: "To press forward to a great principle by breaking through every
other great principle that stands in the way of its establishment ...
is as little consonant to private morality as to public justice." 58
2. The Affirmation
When Congress repealed the 18th Amendment in 1933, many ques-
tioned whether the rule pronounced in Carroll was still good law. Many
years later in United States v. Di Re59 the Court hinted that it was
not. Justice Jackson explained that the lesser protection given to au-
tomobiles by Carroll was justified only during the enforcement of the
National Prohibition Act.60 After briefly reviewing the reasoning em-
ployed in Carroll, he pointed out the delicate politics underlying the
Court's earlier decision:
Obviously the Court should be reluctant to decide that a search
thus authorized by Congress was unreasonable and that the Act
was therefore unconstitutional. In view of the strong presump-
tion of constitutionality due to an Act of Congress, especially
when it turns on what is "reasonable," the Carroll decision
falls short of establishing a doctrine that, without such legis-
lation, automobiles nonetheless are subject to search without
[a] warrant in enforcement of all federal statutes. This Court
has never yet said so. 6'
And the Court did not take the opportunity to say so in Di Re. Instead,
the Court avoided the issue and found that the car had not been
searched at all. 2 Nevertheless,the opinion concluded with some words
of guidance for future cases:
We meet in this case, as in many, the appeal to necessity. It
is said that if such arrests and searches cannot be made, law
enforcement will be more difficult and uncertain. But the fore-
58. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 163, 45 S. Ct. 280, 288-89 (1925)
(McReynolds, J., dissenting).
59. 332 U.S. 581, 68 S. Ct. 222 (1948).
60. Id. at 584, 68 S. Ct. at 223. For an interesting examination of the effect which
Prohibition had upon Carroll and the Fourth Amendment in general, see Murchison,
supra note 4, at 496-502, 524.
61. Di Re, 332 U.S. at 585, 68 S. Ct. at 224.
62. Id. at 586, 68 S. Ct. at 224.
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fathers, after consulting the lessons of history, designed our
Constitution to place obstacles in the way of a too permeating
police surveillance, which they seemed to think was a greater
danger to a free people than the escape of some criminals from
punishment.63
Thus, the dicta and tenor of Di Re suggested that the rule announced
in Carroll would not survive.
Nevertheless, one year later, the Court in Brinegar v. United Statep
relied heavily upon Carroll to uphold the warrantless search of an
automobile which was transporting illegal liquor. The facts of the case
were very similar to those of Carroll. Brinegar was driving his Ford
coupe near the Oklahoma-Missouri border when he passed two police
officers who were parked on the side of the road. The officers recognized
Brinegar as a past offender of bootlegging laws. The coupe was heavily
loaded, and Brinegar increased his speed after passing the officers. The
officers gave chase and were finally able to force Brinegar off the road.
Brinegar admitted that he had twelve cases of liquor in the car. A
warrantless search of the coupe confirmed his confession."5
The Court, assuming that the rule announced in Carroll allowing
the warrantless search of an automobile was still controlling, concerned
itself primarily with deciding if there was enough probable cause to
justify the warrantless search. The Court did not devote any effort to
the second step of the Carroll test, deciding if the circumstances made
it impracticable for the officers to get a search warrant. Thus, the
Court in Brinegar adopted the rule of Carroll with two major changes.
First, the Court relieved the rule from requiring any authorization under
the 18th Amendment or an act of Congress, as was relied on in Carroll.
Second, the Court ignored the requirement that the circumstances for
getting a warrant must be impracticable.
Justice Jackson wrote a scathing dissent. He accused the Court of
"voluntarily dispensing with [a] warrant in this case as a matter of
judicial policy""6 whereas the Court in Carroll had simply given due
deference to an Act of Congress. Hinting that the Court had betrayed
those who fought. in World War II, he wrote that "[u]ncontrolled
search and seizure is one of the first and most effective weapons in
the arsenal of every arbitrary government.' ' 7 Though abuses like those
committed by the fascist governments existing during World War 1I
could not occur in the United States, he warned:
63. Id. at 595, 68 S. Ct. at 229.
64. 338 U.S. 160, 69 S. Ct. 1302 (1949).
65. Id. at 162-63, 69 S. Ct. at 1304.
66. Id. at 183, 69 S. Ct. at 1314 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 180, 69 S. Ct. at 1313 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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We must remember that the extent of any privilege of search
and seizure without [a) warrant which we sustain, the officers
interpret and apply themselves and will push to the limit ...
And we must remember that the authority which we concede
to conduct searches and seizures without [a] warrant may be
exercised by the most unfit and ruthless officers as well as by
the fit and responsible, and resorted to in case of petty mis-
demeanors as well as in the case of the gravest felonies.68
Despite Justice Jackson's heartfelt arguments, the Court's majority
decided that the exigency created by the mobility of the automobile
outweighed the individual's right to be left alone.
3. The Expansion
Although the Carroll rule was very straightforward and had been
simplified by Brinegar, many doubts remained, particularly in the lower
courts.69 For instance, what was the scope of the warrantless search?
May the warrantless search include all parts of the car and the persons
and containers found in the car? When must the warrantless search
occur? Does the rule apply only to searches of contraband in which
the individual, by definition, has no property right?
In 1970, the Court tried to answer some of these questions in
Chambers v. Maroney.10 The Court held that where the police officers
had probable cause to believe that the automobile carried evidence of
a crime, the police may search it later at the station house without a
warrant. One hour after a robbery of a gas station on May 20, 1963,
Pennsylvania police officers sighted a station wagon matching the de-
scription of the getaway car. The police arrested the occupants and
then drove the station wagon to the police station where the car was
thoroughly searched. The warrantless search revealed two .38-caliber
guns under the dashboard and other evidence of the robbery."'
The Court first reaffirmed Carroll as a valid basis to uphold the
constitutionality of the warrantless search. The Court explained that
Carroll had identified a basic difference between the search of auto-
mobiles and the search of houses, and then conspicuously mentioned
the half dozen Supreme Court cases which had either followed, affirmed,
or approved of Carroll from 1925 to 1970. After concluding that Carroll
had established the warrantless search of an automobile based on prob-
68. Id. at 182, 69 S. Ct. at 1314 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
69. Klotter, supra note 16, at 212.
70. 399 U.S. 42, 90 S. Ct. 1975 (1970).
71. Id. at 44, 90 S. Ct. at 1977.
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able cause alone, the Court decided that it made no difference that
the search was conducted at the station house and not at the scene of
the police stop.12 Justice White explained, "The probable-cause factor
still obtained at the station house and so did the mobility of the car
unless the Fourth Amendment permits a warrantless seizure of the car
and the denial of its use to anyone until a warrant is secured."7
Chambers was the first case to address the difficult question of
which police action better protects an individual's Fourth Amendment
rights-a warrantless search or the seizure of the automobile until a
warrant is issued or denied. Justice White suggested:
[A]rguably, only the "lesser" intrusion is permissible until the
magistrate authorizes the "greater." But which is the "greater"
and which the "lesser" intrusion is itself a debatable question
and the answer may depend on a variety of circumstances. For
constitutional purposes, we see no difference between on the
one hand seizing and holding a car before presenting the prob-
able cause issue to a magistrate and on the other hand carrying
out an immediate search without a warrant. Given probable
cause to search, either course is reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment. 4
In dissent, Justice Harlan seized upon the majority's acceptance of
the temporary seizure as reasonable. He noted that the majority did
not argue that the temporary seizure to wait for a warrant would not
fully protect the interests of effective law enforcement." Going beyond
the majority, Justice Harlan reckoned that in nearly all circumstances
the immobilization of the automobile would be a lesser intrusion since
the facts which would give probable cause to search would also provide
probable cause to arrest the individual. 6 He continued:
Since the occupants themselves are to be taken into custody,
they will suffer minimal further inconvenience from the tem-
porary immobilization of their vehicle. Even where no arrests
are made, persons who wish to avoid a search-either to protect
their privacy or to conceal incriminating evidence-will almost
certainly prefer a brief loss of the use of the vehicle in exchange
for the opportunity to have a magistrate pass upon the justi-
fication for the search.77
72. Id. at 48-52, 90 S. Ct. at 1979-81.
73. Id. at 52, 90 S. Ct. at 1981.
74. Id. at 51-52, 90 S. Ct. at 1981.
75. Id. at 63, 90 S. Ct. at 1987 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
76. Id., 90 S. Ct. at 1987 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 63-64, 90 S. Ct. at 1987 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
19921 1219
0LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
Those people who would submit to a warrantless search rather than
have their car immobilized are, of course, free to give their consent
to the search. Just the same, "[wihere consent is not forthcoming, the
occupants of the car have an interest in privacy that is protected by
the Fourth Amendment even where the circumstances justify a temporary
seizure.""8
The Court's insistence upon upholding the search in Chambers
despite a questionable fact pattern led the Court, in South Dakota v.
Opperman,7 9 to announce a second justification for the existence of
the automobile exception. 80 Carroll had justified the automobile excep-
tion upon the inherent mobility of automobiles which created a danger
that the contraband could be removed from the jurisdiction before a
warrant could be issued. In Opperman, Chief Justice Burger concluded
that Chambers had shown in contradiction that a warrantless search
would be constitutional even "where no immediate danger was presented
that the car would be removed from the jurisdiction. "8' Thus, to explain
the aberration of allowing warrantless searches of automobiles in less
than exigent circumstances, he wrote:
[L]ess rigorous warrant requirements govern because the ex-
pectation of privacy with respect to one's automobile is sig-
nificantly less than that relating to one's home or office. In
discharging their varied responsibilities for ensuring the public
safety, law enforcement officials are necessarily brought into
frequent contact with automobiles. Most of this contact is dis-
tinctly noncriminal in nature. Automobiles, unlike homes, are
subjected to pervasive and continuing governmental regulation
and controls, including periodic inspection and licensing re-
quirements. As an everyday occurrence, police stop and examine
vehicles [for various minor violations] ....
The expectation of privacy as to automobiles is further
diminished by the obviously public nature of automobile travel.8 2
This new rationale for the automobile exception greatly expanded
the permissible use of the exception. First, Brinegar detached Carroll
from its justification in light of the 18th Amendment and the National
Prohibition Act. Next, Chambers divorced Carroll from its justification
78. Id. at 64, 90 S. Ct. at 1988 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968)). This appeared to hint at the practicability requirement
of Carroll which had apparently been forgotten by the Court in Brinegar.
79. 428 U.S. 364, 96 S. Ct. 3092 (1976).
80. Although two earlier cases had initially formulated the basis for the second
justification, Opperman became the primary case relied upon for this proposition in later
opinions. See Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 94 S. Ct. 2464 (1974); Cady v. Dom-
browski, 413 U.S. 433, 93 S. Ct. 2523 (1973).
81. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 367, 96 S. Ct. at 3096.
82. Id. at 367.68, 96 S. Ct. at 3096 (citation omitted).
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that a citizen could not have Fourth Amendment property rights in
contraband. But Opperman stripped from the rule of Carroll its realistic
basis that under certain circumstances the police simply could not get
a warrant. Instead, Opperman justified a police infringement of the
Fourth Amendment simply because in some esoteric way Americans did
not adequately protect their privacy interests in automobiles from leg-
islative regulations.
While Chambers answered some questions, an issue of immense
importance remained: what was the scope of the warrantless search of
an automobile? The dicta in Opperman had hardly begun to be seriously
tested when the Court took the opportunity to place some limits on
the use of the automobile exception. Within a few years, the broad
exception which had been born of Carroll was to come face to face
with the traditional protections granted to the personal effects placed
by an increasingly mobile society into containers such as briefcases,
luggage, safes, crates, boxes, and sacks.
4. The Limitation
The following year, in 1977, Chief Justice Burger tried to limit
Opperman's broad dicta in United States v. Chadwick.83 The Chief
Justice held that the warrantless search of a footlocker one and a half
hours after being removed from the trunk of a car was unreasonable.
On May 10, 1973, narcotics agents in Boston closely watched two
passengers arriving from San Diego claim their unusually heavy foot-
locker. The agents had been alerted that the footlocker and its possessor
were possibly trafficking marijuana or hashish. The agents released a
drug-sniffing dog which signaled the presence of drugs within the foot-
locker. The defendant Chadwick then joined the couple, and together
they carried the footlocker to a car. They placed the footlocker in the
trunk. The agents then promptly arrested Chadwick and the couple,
transported the footlocker to the Federal Building, and opened it one
and a half hours later. The footlocker contained large amounts of
marijuana."
Chief Justice Burger first reasoned that the Warrant Clause of the
Fourth Amendment protects people from unreasonable government in-
trusions into their legitimate expectations of privacy regardless of the
locale of the object of the search."' The Warrant Clause itself does not
distinguish between the search of homes and other searches. Looking
to the history of the clause, he concluded that the record was incon-
clusive because searches outside of the home were not a large issue in
83. 433 U.S. 1, 97 S. Ct. 2476 (1977).
84. Id. at 3-5, 97 S. Ct. at 2479-80.
85. Id. at 7, 97 S. Ct. at 2481.
19921 1221
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
colonial America. He wrote, "What we do know is that the Framers
were men who focused on the wrongs of that day but who intended
the Fourth Amendment to safeguard fundamental values which would
far outlast the specific abuses which gave it birth.""6
Chief Justice Burger pointed out that the footlocker had been both
locked and padlocked. Such a sign of an expectation of privacy in the
contents of the footlocker was due the protection of the Fourth Amend-
ment. Without either an exigency or a warrant, the search was found
to be unconstitutional. In this case, the police had no warrant, and
no exigency existed because the footlocker had been under the absolute
control of the police for over an hour at the time of the search.87
One should note that the government did not contend on appeal
that the automobile exception justified the search of the footlocker."8
However, the government did argue that the rationale of the automobile
exception should apply to luggage.' 9 The Court declined to accept this
argument. Chief Justice Burger acknowledged that the Court had rec-
ognized crucial differences between searches of automobiles and other
property, and he again explained that automobiles are subject to a
lesser expectation of privacy. Nevertheless, he conceded that the factors
which diminish the privacy aspects of an automobile do not apply to
a footlocker9 0 He asserted: "Luggage contents are not open to public
view . . . nor is luggage subject to regular inspections and official
scrutiny on a continuing basis. Unlike an automobile, whose primary
function is transportation, luggage is intended as a repository of personal
effects."91 Thus, Chief Justice Burger continued to propagate the as-
sumption of a lesser expectation of privacy in an automobile, while
plainly recognizing the need to limit this rationale to the automobile
itself and to not apply it to any containers found within the automobile.
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Rehnquist in dissent, wrote
against any such retreat. He speculated that had the agents waited a
few minutes longer, after Chadwick had begun to drive away, the
warrantless search of the footlocker would have been permissible under
the automobile exception. He explained that the scope of the exception
86. Id. at 8-9, 97 S. Ct. at 2482.
87. Id. at 15, 97 S. Ct. at 2485-86.
88. The First Circuit Court of Appeals and the district court rejected any claim of
justification under the automobile exception. The car's engine had not even been started
at the time of the initial seizure of the footlocker. See 532 F.2d. 773 (1st Cir. 1976);
393 F. Supp. 763 (D. Mass. 1975).
89. The automobile exception had always been justified in part by the rapid mobility
of the vehicle which would allow a suspect to flee the jurisdiction of the. law officer
before a warrant could be issued. Luggage, it was argued, could also be easily removed
from the officer's jurisdiction.
90. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 11-13, 97 S. Ct. at 2483-84.
91. Id. at 13, 97 S. Ct. at 2484.
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extends to the contents of locked compartments, including glove com-
partments and the trunk. 92 He then went on to cite a handful of cases
from the Courts of Appeals which had construed the automobile ex-
ception to include briefcases, suitcases, and footlockers found inside
automobiles.93 Even though the car was not moving, Justice Blackmun
believed that the footlocker was subject to a warrantless search because
of its presence in the automobile's trunk.
Arkansas v. Sanders,94 considered in 1979, presented the question
which Justice Blackmun had hypothecated in Chadwick: may the police
conduct a warrantless search of a suitcase found in the trunk of a
moving car? The Court held that the warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment applies equally to all personal luggage whether taken from
an automobile or elsewhere, 9' and, that the automobile exception will
not justify the warrantless search of luggage "merely because it was
located in an automobile lawfully stopped by the police." ' 96 The facts
of Sanders were very much like those in Chadwick, with the major
difference being that the container in question was an unlocked suitcase
which was recovered from the trunk of a moving taxi. On April 23,
1976, an officer of the Little Rock Police Department received word
from a reliable informant that Sanders would arrive at the Little Rock
Airport later that day carrying a green suitcase full of marijuana.
Sanders arrived and placed the green suitcase in the trunk of a taxi,
and the police stopped the taxi shortly after it drove away from the
airport. 97
Justice Powell, writing for the majority, began his opinion with a
summary of Fourth Amendment principles, notably writing that a search
must be both reasonable and made pursuant to a warrant." He noted,
however, that the Court had created some exceptions to the warrant
92. Id. at 22-23, 97 S. Ct. at 2489 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
93. 433 U.S. at 23 n.4, 97 S. Ct. at 2489 n.4 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The cases
which Judge Blackmun cited for this proposition were not based on the automobile
exception, but instead on the inventory exception to the Fourth Amendment. Justice
Blackmun also seemed to be a bit confused about the differences between the automobile
exception and a search incident to an arrest. He complained that "[t]he Court's opinion
does not explain why a wallet carried in the arrested person's clothing, but not the
footlocker in the present case, is subject to 'reduced expectations of privacy caused by
the arrest."' 433 U.S at 20, 97 S. Ct. at 2488. A discussion of inventory searches and
searches incident to arrest are beyond the scope of this comment.
94. 442 U.S. 753, 99 S. Ct. 2586 (1979).
95. Id. at 765-66, 99 S. Ct. at 2594.
96. Id. at 765, 99 S. Ct. at 2594.
97. Id. at 755, 99 S. Ct. at 2588.
98. Id. at 758, 99 S. Ct. at 2590 ("The mere reasonableness of a search, assessed
in the light of the surrounding circumstances, is not a substitute for the judicial warrant
required under the Fourth Amendment.").
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requirement where it "concluded that the public interest required some
flexibility in the application of the general rule that a valid warrant is
a prerequisite for a search."" He continued:
Thus, a few "jealously and carefully drawn" exceptions provide
for those cases where the societal costs of obtaining a warrant;
such as danger to law officers or the risk of loss or destruction
of evidence, outweigh the reasons for prior recourse to a neutral
magistrate. But because each exception to the warrant require-
ment invariably impinges to some extent on the protective pur-
pose of the Fourth Amendment ... "the burden is on those
seeking the exemption to show the need for it."'"
He explained that the distinction between automobiles and other per-
sonal property is based, first, upon the exigent circumstances which
can exist due to the inherent mobility of the vehicle. Second, "the
configuration, use, and regulation of automobiles often may dilute the
reasonable expectation of privacy that exists with respect to differently
situated property."' 0 '
Justice Powell concluded that the suitcase was subject to neither
of the traditional rationales for the automobile exception. The suitcase
was no longer mobile, for "the exigency of mobility must be assessed
at the point immediately before the search-after the police have seized
the object to be searched and have it securely within their control."'0 2
Also, the expectation of privacy in the suitcase is not reduced by being
placed in a car since the "very purpose of a suitcase is to serve as a
repository for personal items when one wishes to transport them."' 03
Therefore, the search of the luggage without a warrant was not justified
by any exception to the Fourth Amendment. Justice Powell stressed
that the Supreme Court had never, before Sanders, ruled on the con-
stitutionality of a warrantless search of luggage taken from a lawfully
99. Id. at 759, 99 S. Ct. at 2590.
100. Id. at 759-60, 99 S. Ct. at 2590-91 (citations omitted).
101. Id. at 761, 99 S. Ct. at 2591.
102. Id. at 763, 99 S. Ct. at 2593. At first blush, such an assessment of probable
cause would eliminate the exigency exception to the Fourth Amendment. However, the
test would still allow inadvertent searches, and an exigency could still exist in situations
in which the police absolutely could not secure the item until a warrant is issued (for
example, when luggage suspected of containing cocaine is on fire).
103. Id. at 764, 99 S. Ct. at 2593. Arguably, Justice Powell's analysis would apply
to all containers found in an automobile, assuming the container is not an integral part
of the vehicle. However, Justice Powell recognized that some containers, such as a kit
of burglar tools or a gun case, could not support a reasonable expectation of privacy.
The contents -of such containers can be inferred from their outer appearance, and thus
would not deserve the full protection of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 765 n.13, 99 S.
Ct. at 2594 n.13.
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stopped automobile. He explained that Carroll, Chambers, and Op-
perman had all involved searches of some integral part of the auto-
mobile.104
A vigorous dissent written by Justice Blackmun and joined by Justice
Rehnquist adamantly argued that the luggage was as mobile as the
automobile which carried it. Justice Blackmun also doubted that an
individual's expectation of privacy in luggage was significantly greater
than in the trunk or locked glove compartment of the car.'10 Further,
the dissent lamented that Sanders undermined the automobile exception
and would lead to "greater difficulties for law enforcement officers,
for prosecutors, for those suspected of criminal activity, and, of course,
for the courts themselves."' Justice Blackmun proposed that the Court
adopt a clear-cut rule which would allow a warrantless search and
seizure of any personal property found in an automobile.10
A concurring opinion written by Chief Justice Burger and joined
by Justice Stevens sharply criticized the dissent's approach:
The dissent complains that the Court does not adopt a "clear"
rule, presumably one capable of resolving future Fourth Amend-
ment litigation. That is not cause for lament, however desirable
it might be to fashion a universal prescription governing the
myriad Fourth Amendment cases that might arise. We are con-
struing the Constitution, not writing a statute or a manual for
law enforcement officers. 0
The concurrence also argued that Sanders, like Chadwick, did not
involve the automobile exception. Instead, the Chief Justice offered a
novel approach. He suggested that cases in which the suspected locus
of contraband is a container and in which the relationship between the
automobile and the container was purely coincidental do not invoke
the automobile exception. Chief Justice Burger explained, "The fact
that the suitcase was resting in the trunk of the automobile at the time
of [Sanders'] arrest does not turn this into an 'automobile' exception
104. Id. at 763, 99 S. Ct. at 2592-93. For example, in Carroll the police had searched
the inside of the car seats.
105. Id. at 769, 99 S. Ct. at 2596 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 768, 99 S. Ct. at 2595 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
107.. Id. at 772, 99 S. Ct. at 2597 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun's cry
for "bright-line" rules to guide the officer in the field has been a consistent justification
used to broaden the exceptions to the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Colorado v. Bertine,
479 U.S. 367, 375, 107 S. Ct. 738, 743 (1987) (expanded inventory searches); Illinois v.
Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 648, 103 S. Ct. 2605, 2610-11 (1983) (expanded station-house
searches of the suspect); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 101 S. Ct. 2860 (1981)
(expanded search incident to arrest in automobiles to include the warrantless search of
any containers found in the passenger compartment).
108. Sanders, 442 U.S. at 768, 99 S. Ct. at 2595 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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case." 09 This analysis gave birth to the "particular" versus "general"
probable cause approach to searches involving vehicles.
Under Chief Justice Burger's approach, where the facts which es-
tablished probable cause focused on a container which happened to be
in an automobile, the police were said to have "particular" or "specific"
probable cause. To search the container, the police would have to get
a search warrant. Conversely, where the facts establishing probable
cause indicated that contraband was located in an unknown location
somewhere within the car, the police were said to have "general"
probable cause. With "general" probable cause the police may search
the entire automobile without a warrant. This search would include any
containers located in the car, regardless of whether the contraband was
ultimately located in a specific container. This distinction between "gen-
eral" and "specific" probable cause, suggested by the concurring opin-
ion, would eventually be the downfall of Sanders and Chadwick.
5. The Conflict
In an attempt to reconcile Carroll and Chambers with Sanders and
Chadwick, the Court had created an arbitrary line distinguishing between
probable cause which focused on a container which happened to be in
an automobile ("particular" or "specific" probable cause) and probable
cause which led police to believe that contraband or evidence of a
crime would be found somewhere within the car ("general" probable
cause). Although many on the Court were uncomfortable with drawing
such lines, this analysis became accepted and applied to Fourth Amend-
ment cases throughout the 1980s. The threshold question no longer
asked about the object or locale of the search, but rather concerned
the locus or initial impetus of the probable cause which led to the
search. Chadwick and Sanders were not regarded as automobile excep-
tion cases, and their effect upon the exception was questionable. Thus,
the question remained: what is the scope of a warrantless search justified
by the automobile exception?
In United States v. Ross,"10 the Court held that the police may
conduct a warrantless search of the vehicle as thoroughly as if conducted
under a warrant "particularly describing the place to be searched.""'
Thus, where the police have lawfully stopped an automobile and have
probable cause to believe that contraband or evidence of a crime is
located somewhere within the car, they may search all compartinents
and containers found in the car which might contain the object of the
109. Id. at 767, 99 S. Ct. at 2595 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
110. 456 U.S. 798, 102 S. C. 2157 (1982).
111. Id. at 800, 102 S. Ct. at 2160.
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search."'2 In Ross, the District of Columbia Police Department had
been told by a reliable informant that Ross was selling narcotics from
the trunk of his Chevrolet Malibu. Three policemen drove to the area
described by the informant and located Ross' car. Nobody was in or
near the vehicle. The policemen then left the area to avoid arousing
suspicion. They returned five minutes later to see the Malibu being
driven around the corner. The police then stopped the car and ordered
Ross out of the vehicle for a body search. While searching the interior
of the car, the police found a bullet on the front seat and a pistol in
the glove compartment, whereupon they arrested Ross. The police then
opened the trunk and found a paper bag which contained many glassine
bags of heroin. The police drove the car to the police station where
they conducted a more thorough search. The search discovered a zip-
pered red leather pouch containing $3200 cash in the trunk."1
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, reasoned that the "spe-
cifically established and well delineated" exception recognized in Carroll" 4
would be "largely nullified if the permissible scope of a warrantless
search of an automobile did not include containers and packages found
inside the vehicle""' 5 since contraband, due to its secretive nature, will
rarely be placed inside an automobile unless it is enclosed in a container.
He argued that Chadwick and Sanders could have no effect on the
case since neither involved probable cause to search the automobile or
anything within it except the footlocker and suitcase. 16 Thus, the Court
held they were not automobile exception cases. Ross, however, was an
automobile case because the police had probable cause to search the
entire vehicle," 7 or at least the entire trunk, an integral part of the
car. Furthermore, Justice Stevens argued, courts had, before Chadwick
and Sanders, routinely allowed the warrantless search of containers
during a warrantless search of the automobile." '
The Court decided that the rule announced in Ross would apply
to all containers regardless of their ostensible security, and although a
case could be made for distinquishing between "worthy" and "un-
worthy" containers, such an approach would be antithetical to the
Fourth Amendment."19 Thus, the fragile, wrinkled paper bag would
112. Id. at 825, 102 S. Ct. at 2173.
113. Id. at 800-01, 102 S. Ct. at 2160.
114. Id. at 825, 102 S. Ct. at 2173.
115. Id. at 820, 102 S. Ct. at 2170.
116. Id. at 814, 102 S. Ct. at 2167.
117. Id. at 817, 102 S. Ct. at 2168-69.
118. Id. at 819 n.25, 102 S. Ct. at 2170 n.25.
119. Id. at 821-22, 102 S. Ct. at 2171. The Court did not explain why such all
approach would be inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment. Why is the Court's dis-
tinction between houses and automobiles not equally inconsistent?
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receive as much protection as the triple-locked steel chest. The Court
also recognized that an individual may very well have an expectation
of privacy in the automobile, its trunk, its glove compartment, and
the containers placed within the vehicle. Nevertheless, "(these interests
must yield to the authority of a search ... which-in light of Carroll-
does not itself require the prior approval of a magistrate."'120 Justice
Stevens pointed out that in Carroll, the owner of the car certainly had
a-significant interest that the upholstery of his car not be ripped apart,
yet, such concerns were not dispositive in 1925 and were still not
dispositive in 1982. Justice Blackmun, in a concurring opinion, disa-
greed: "[O]ne's 'reasonable expectation of privacy' is a particularly
relevant factor in determining the validity of a warrantless search."'1'
Nonetheless, Justice Blackmun explained that an individual can have
only very limited expectations of privacy in an automobile.
Justice Brennan recognized that the majority had taken "a first
step toward an unprecedented 'probable cause' exception to the warrant
requirement." '2 In Brennan's opinion, the majority had not relied upon
the justifications underpinning the automobile exception-mobility and
a lesser expectation of privacy. Instead the majority had justified the
warrantless search of containers found in the car only upon a general
probable cause standard, determined by the police officer in the field.
Presumably the majority circumvented the requirement of a magistrate's
prior determination of probable cause, which provides much more pro-
tection to the individual than a post hoc judicial review of a police
officer's determination in the pursuit of police efficiency., " Justice
Brennan also pointed out that the majority had inadvertently created
an enigma where the prosecutor "must show that the investigating
officer knew enough but not too much, that he had sufficient knowledge
to establish probable cause but insufficient knowledge to know exactly
where the contraband was located." 2 4
Following Ross, the conflict between Chadwick/Sanders and Car-
roll/Ross became clear. The true key to any automobile case would be
in presenting the probable cause in terms which would allow the search
of the automobile itself, including any containers therein, and thereby
fall under the broad exception granted by Ross. Any probable cause
which focused too closely on the container would presumably be con-
trolled by Chadwick and Sanders. Of course, some puzzles remained.
For instance, which line of cases would be determinative where the
'120. Id. at 823, 102 S. Ct. at 2172.
121. Id. at 826, 102 S. Ct. at 2173 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
122. Id. at 828, 102 S. Ct. at 2174 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
123. Id. at 828-34, 102 S. Ct. at 2174-77 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
124. Id. at 840, 102 S. Ct. at 2181 (Brennan, J.. dissenting) (citing 210 U.S. App.
D.C. 342, 384, 655 F.2d 1159, 1201 (1981) (en banc) (Wilkey, J., dissenting)).
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police initially seize a container toward which they have specific probable
cause, but at the scene, circumstances show probable cause to search
the entire vehicle? Might the warrantless searches of containers allowed
by Ross be conducted at a later time, as the search of the vehicle itself
might according to Chambers? Which line of cases would control when
local police have probable cause to believe the car contains marijuana
while the FBI has probable cause to believe that a suitcase in the trunk
contains stolen treasury plates?'25 The Court answered most of these
questions three years later.
The Court held in United States v. Johns' 6 that the warrantless
search of containers allowed by Ross may be reasonably conducted
three days after the containers had been removed from the vehicle.
Furthermore, the facts of the case and the disposition of the Court
imply that when in doubt, Ross prevails over Chadwick and Sanders.
United States Customs officers in Arizona, suspecting a drug smuggling
operation, mounted a ground and air surveillance through which they
saw two pickup trucks travel over 100 miles to a remote private airstrip
less than 50 miles from the Mexican border. Two small aircraft then
landed in succession. The custom officers in the air saw one of the
trucks approach the first aircraft. Shortly after both aircraft left, 27 one
of the Customs officers on the ground crept up to watch one of the
trucks. He saw a person at the rear of the truck cover the contents
with a blanket. The officer then ordered the suspects to lie on the
ground. As other Customs officers approached the trucks, they smelled
marijuana. Exposed in the back of the truck were many packages
wrapped in dark green plastic and sealed with tape. Similarly wrapped
packages were commonly known to contain smuggled marijuana. The
police then arrested the suspects. The police did not search the packages
at the airstrip, but instead, the police drove the packages to DEA
headquarters in Tucson where the packages were stored in the DEA
warehouse. Three days after the initial seizure of the packages, the
officers opened them without a warrant. 128
Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, decided that the officers
had probable cause at the airstrip to believe that the two pickup trucks
125. Suppose local police pull over a car driven by Mr. X for speeding and, while
issuing a ticket, notice the odor of marijuana. Meanwhile, a records check on the vehicle
indicates a contemporaneous request to hold the vehicle for a FBI search. The FBI has
reliable information that Mr. X possesses a suitcase with the stolen plates, and a search
of Mr.X's home revealed that Mr. X had recently left the house with the suitcase.
126. 469 U.S. 478, 105 S. Ct. 881 .(1985).
127. Mr. Johns was the pilot of one of the planes. The Customs Office surveillance
aircraft followed the two airplanes to the Tucson airport, where, upon landing, Johns
was arrested.
128. Johns, 469 U.S. at 480-81, 105 S. Ct. at 883.
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contained contraband.' Therefore a warrantless search was approved
under Ross. She explained that this probable cause arose when the
officers first smelled the marijuana even though they did not know the
odor's exact origin. She explained that the officers were unaware of
the packages at that time, and contraband might have been hidden
elsewhere within the trucks. Moreover, under Chambers, the police need
not conduct the search contemporaneously with the stop of the auto-
mobile. As long as probable cause still exists, the police may conduct
a warrantless search of the containers.130
One must note that the majority deliberately found probable cause
to search the entire truck despite facts which indicated otherwise. While
admittedly at one point in time the Customs officers were briefly
unaware of the packages and therefore could only assume that con-
traband was somewhere in the trucks, the officers were aware of the
packages at the time of the search. Indeed, the officers quickly became
aware of the packages after walking toward the trucks, at most 90
feet.' Once the officers saw the packages, they had little cause to
believe contraband would be located elsewhere in the trucks. The courier
airplanes had left shortly before the seizure, and the two trucks which
had earlier traveled 100 miles were loaded with packages which are
commonly used to smuggle marijuana. The smugglers did not have the
time or motive to unwrap and hide contraband within the trucks.3 2
Furthermore, the officers never searched the trucks themselves. Justice
O'Connor found this fact "meritless," but the fact illustrates the point
that the officers themselves never developed probable cause regarding
the trucks. 33 If the police did have general probable cause to believe
that the truck contained contraband, aside from the packages, 34 then
129. Id. at 482, 105 S. Ct. at 884.
130. Id. at 482-86, 105 S. Ct. at 884-86.
131. The officers were parked approximately 90 feet away from the trucks. If the
officers had smelled the marijuana immediately upon exiting their own vehicles and did
not see the packages until standing on top of the pickup trucks, even a leisurely walk
of 90 feet would have taken less than one minute.
132. Nor would it be reasonable for the truck drivers to bring other drugs to a major
pick-up.
133. While the Court has been willing to uphold actions taken by policemen in good
faith reliance on a warrant (see, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S. Ct.
3405 (1984)), the Court has been unwilling to balance this with the rejection of actions
taken in good faith non-reliance. Thus, the Court has allowed the subjective beliefs of
the police officer to work only to the benefit of the government. Although the Court
approves of searches without actual authority but with the officer's good faith belief in
the warrant's validity, the Court will not conversely allow the officer's subjective belief
that the search is illegal to thwart or limit an otherwise valid search. Thus, the officer's
subjective belief can only work in his favor.
134. If the police believed that only the packages contained contraband, then the
probable cause would have been "specific" to the packages. If so, Chadwick and Sanders
should have controlled, necessitating a warrant.
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they would have been remiss to limit their search to the packages.
Rather, probable cause to search the trucks was a fiction created by
the Court, exemplifying the point that the Court was adamant on
favoring Ross over Chadwick whenever possible.
6. The Resolution
Although Chadwick and Sanders remained good law on the search
of containers, the Court was likely to find that Ross applied to virtually
any search of any object found in an automobile. Johns had expanded
Ross to include cases where the officers at some point had probable
cause to believe that the vehicle contained contraband, even where their
probable cause was seconds later limited to containers therein. In the
same term, the Court expanded Ross to include the search of motor
homes. " '
Chadwick remained the prevailing law where the police focus was
aimed at a particular container in an automobile. 3 6 Nevertheless, the
Court would find Ross controlling in practically any situation which
could create probable cause in the entire car, thereby dispensing with
the need for a warrant. 13 In the conflict between Ross and Chadwick,
the former had clearly dominated. California v. Acevedo 38 challenged
the Court to decide whether Chadwick had been entirely vanquished.
In Acevedo, the Court decided that even where the police have particular
probable cause to search a container found in an automobile, the
automobile exception applies. Consequently, a search warrant is not
necessary. This comment will next examine the facts and reasoning
which led the Court to this conclusion. 39
III. TnE ACEvEDO DECISION
A. The Factual Setting and Procedural History
In October of i987, federal drug enforcement agents in Hawaii
discovered a picnic cooler containing bags of marijuana. The cooler
135. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 105 S. Ct. 2066 (1985).
136. Klotter, supra note 16, at 216.
137. Really, Johns was the only case which presented a confrontation between the
two cases. Obviously, the Court held that Ross controlled in that case. Moreover, after
Ross, the Court never again followed (in a Shepard's sense) Chadwick. Within the Courts
of Appeals, Chadwick was followed only nine times. Ross was followed fifty-four times.
138. 111 S. Ct. 1982 (1991).
139. Given the strongly conservative outlook of the current Court and its apparent
long term hold on the later make-up of the Supreme Court, it appears that Acevedo
will be the final statement of the law of searches of containers found in cars for many
years.
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was to be mailed by Federal Express to a J.R. Daza of Santa Ana,
California. The DEA agents contacted Officer Coleman of the Santa
Ana Police Department and arranged a "controlled delivery" to discover
and arrest the recipient. The package containing the picnic cooler was
sent directly to Officer Coleman who made arrangements for the con-
trolled delivery with the local Federal Express office.'
40
Upon receipt of the package, Officer Coleman opened the package
to make sure that it did in fact contain nine clear plastic bags of
marijuana, each bag weighing approximately two pounds and measuring
12"x4"x3". He then repackaged the box and left it at the Federal
Express office to be picked up, presumably by the addressee. On October
30, 1987, at 10:30 a.m., a man who identified himself as Jamie Daza
claimed the package. He then drove the package back to his apartment,
secretly followed by the police. He took the package into his apartment.
Several policemen remained in the area to watch for a sign that Daza
was aware of the contents of the package, establishing criminal intent.
At 11:45 a.m. Daza exited his apartment and disposed of the emptied
package and wrappings in a trash bin. Officer Coleman then left the
scene to get a search warrant for the apartment, Daza, and Daza's
automobile. Other policemen remained in the area to secure the apart-
ment."4 '
At 12:05 p.m., Richard St. George, previously unknown to the
police, emerged from the apartment wearing a blue knapsack which
looked half full. St. George then began to drive out of the apartment
complex. Suspecting that he was carrying marijuana, the police stopped
St. George and searched his knapsack. The police found about one
and a half pounds of marijuana. 42
At 12:30 p.m., Charles Steven Acevedo, also unknown to the police
observers, entered the apartment empty handed. Ten minutes later he
emerged, carrying a full brown paper lunchbag. According to the police,
the lunchbag was the approximate size of the wrapped marijuana pack-
ages seen earlier by Officer Coleman. Acevedo walked to his silver
Honda in the parking lot and placed the lunchbag into the trunk. He
then tried to drive out of the apartment complex. To prevent the possible
loss of evidence, a marked police car stopped the Honda and opened
the trunk. The police opened the lunchbag and found about three
eighths of a pound of marijuana.'43 A magistrate issued a search warrant
for the apartment at 12:40 p.m., and Officer Coleman returned to the
140. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. at 1984.
141. Id.; Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 7-10, California v. Acevedo, !II S. Ct.
1982 (No. 89-1690).
142. Acevedo, II1 S. Ct. at 1984.
143. Id. at 1984-85; Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 10-11. Acevedo, (No. 89-
1690).
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scene a short time later. A search of the apartment revealed several
bags of marijuana.'"
.On June 24, 1988, the District Attorney of Orange County charged
both Acevedo and St. George with one count of possession of marijuana
for sale.'14 Acevedo entered a plea of "not guilty." On October 7,
1988, the Superior Court heard and rejected Acevedo's motion to sup-
press the evidence discovered during the warrantless search. In response,
Acevedo entered into a plea bargain. Acevedo entered a guilty plea and
was granted probation on certain terms and conditions, including thirty
days in custody and a $100 fine. Acevedo then filed a Notice of Appeal
on November 10, 1988, seeking to reverse the Superior Court's refusal
to suppress the evidence of the warrantless search.' 6
Over a year later, on December 12, 1989, a California Court of
Appeal agreed with the defendant and reversed the Superior Court. 47
The court found that the police did have probable cause to believe
that the lunchbag contained contraband. Despite this, the court decided
that under Chadwick the police officers could not open the lawfully
seized lunchbag without first getting a warrant.'" However, the court
expressed some dissatisfaction with the state of the search and seizure
jurisprudence:
We recognize the anomalous nature of the Ross-Chadwick
dichotomy: If police have probable cause to believe contraband
is concealed in a particular container, they must obtain a war-
rant before searching it, even when it is being stored in a
vehicle. If the investigation has, for whatever reason, yet to
focus on a particular container and there is only probable cause
to believe the contraband is located somewhere in an auto-
mobile, officers may conduct a warrantless search of any con-
tainer in the car that could reasonably conceal the evidence....
One unfortunate feature of the rule is an incentive for police
officers to withhold evidence related to probable cause in order
to fit within the more generous confines of Ross. Despite mis-
givings concerning the continuing validity of Chadwick after
Ross, we are in no position to ignore the Supreme Court's
current mandate.' 4 9
144. Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 11, Acevedo, (No. 89-1690).
145. Acevedo, III S. Ct. at 1985 (They were in violation of Cal. Health & Safety
Code § 11359 (West 1991)).
146. Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 5-6, California v. Acevedo, III S. Ct. 1982
(No. 89-1690).
147. People v. Acevedo, 265 Cal. Rptr. 23 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 1989).
148. Id. at 25.
149. Id. at 27.
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Notwithstanding any misgivings, and since Chadwick was controlling,
the court held a search warrant was required. Furthermore, the court
explicitly rejected the State's contention that probable cause to get a
search warrant is the equivalent of having done so. 5 0
On March 15, 1990, the California Supreme Court denied the State's
petition for review which claimed that Ross justified the search. How-
ever, Justice O'Connor stayed the enforcement of the Court of Appeal's
judgment pending the disposition of the State's petition for certiorari
which was granted.'
B. The Supreme Court's Reasoning
Justice Blackmun delivered the majority opinion ordering the re-
versal of the California Court of Appeal. The majority held, "The
interpretation of the Carroll doctrine set forth in Ross now applies to
all searches of containers found in an automobile. In other words, the
police may search without a warrant if their search is supported by
probable cause.' '152
Justice Blackmun began his opinion, following a summary of the
case facts, with a brief review of Carroll, Chambers, Ross, Chadwick,
and Sanders. He then concluded that the conflict between Chadwick
and Carroll had led the Court to create a senseless distinction between
particular and general probable cause. In Ross, the Court tried to
assuage the problem and had taken the "critical step of saying that
closed containers in cars could be searched without a warrant because
of their presence within the automobile."' 153 However, in deference to
the rule in Chadwick and Sanders, the Court delayed taking the final
step of ruling that the Fourth Amendment allows a warrantless search
of a container in a movable vehicle even if the police lack probable
cause to search the entire car. Justice Blackmun decided that it was
time for the Court to explicitly overrule the lingering decisions of
Chadwick and Sanders. 54
Justice Blackmun began the dismantling of the Chadwick-Sanders
rule:
We now agree that a container found after a general search of
the automobile and a container found in a car after a limited
search for the container are equally easy for the police to store
and for the suspect to hide or destroy. In fact, we see no
150. Id. at 28.
151. California v. Acevedo, Ill S. Ct. 39 (1991).
152. California v. Acevedo, III S. Ct. 1982, 1991 (1991). Although the Court explicitly
overuled only Sanders, it seems that Chadwick is also implicitly overruled.
153. Id. at 1987.
154. Id. at 1988.
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principled distinction in terms of either the privacy expectation
or the exigent circumstances between the paper bag found by
the police in Ross and the paper bag found by the police here.
Furthermore, by attempting to distinguish between a container
for which the police are specifically searching and a container
which they come across in a car, we have provided only minimal
protection for privacy and have impeded effective law enforce-
ment. "
Justice Blackmun presented three reasons why the Chadwick-Sanders
rule did not protect an individual's privacy interest. First, the anomalous
dichotomy of particular and general probable cause encouraged police
to search the entire car so as to persuade the courts that the police
had a good faith belief that contraband was located in an unknown
location within the car. The police would thereby be able to take
advantage of the warrantless search exception granted by Ross which
would extend to the search of any container located in the automobile.
Presumably the police would engage in such specious behavior even
where they have marginal or no probable cause to believe that the car
contains contraband in any place aside from a specific container."56
Second, Justice Blackmun, citing New York v. Belton, argued that
any protection which Chadwick offered the individual would in all
likelihood be transitory or illusory. Since the police had probable cause
or at least a strong basis to seize the container, in all probability a
judicial warrant will be routinely forthcoming for the search of the
container. Also, the facts or information which supported the seizure
of the container will usually be enough to support an arrest of the
individual. If the person is near his car at the time of arrest, the police
could conduct a warrantless search of any containers within the pas-
senger compartment. 5 Thus, often the police could search the container
without a warrant regardless of Chadwick and Sanders."'
Third, he argued that the search of a lunchbag cannot breach a
protected privacy interest when such a search is much less intrusive
than the upholstery slashing search which the Court sanctioned in
Carroll. He wrote that "[i]f destroying the interior of an automobile
155. Id.
156. Id. As support for such possible shady police work, he referred to Johns.
Although the Court had rejected the argument that the police must actually search the
entire car to qualify for the generous ambit of Ross, presumably lower courts would
nevertheless be more likely to uphold a Ross-type warrantless search if the entire car
had been searched.
157. Id. at 1989 (citing New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 101 S. Ct. 2860 (1981)).
158. Id. at 1989.
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is not unreasonable, we cannot conclude that looking inside a container
is."1159
Justice Blackmun then went on to explain that while Chadwick and
Sanders serve little or no privacy interests, the two cases had strongly
hampered the criminal justice system and effective police investigation.
In his view, Chadwick's conflict with Carroll and Ross had confused
the police officer in the field who could not be expected to fathom
the subtle distinctions between the two lines of cases. However, Justice
Blackmun did not explain how such confusion actually hampered ef-
fective law enforcement. Additionally, the Court noted that this con-
fusion had also permeated the lower courts as shown by the twenty-
nine Fourth Amendment cases that the Supreme Court had decided
since 1982. Justice Blackmun finished his argument:
IT]he existence of the dual regimes for automobile searches that
uncover containers has proved as confusing as the Chadwick
and Sanders dissenters predicted. We conclude that it is better
to adopt one clear-cut rule to govern automobile searches and
eliminate the warrant requirement for closed containers set forth
in Sanders.'60
Justice Blackmun claimed that the holding in Acevedo did not extend
the "Carroll doctrine" or "broaden the scope of the permissible au-
tomobile search" as developed in Carroll, Chambers, and Ross. He
also claimed that the Fourth Amendment still required that warrantless
searches are unreasonable per se, subject only to a few specifically
established and well-delineated exceptions. 16'
IV. CRmCAL ANALYSIS OF ACEVEDO
A. Flawed Assumptions
1. Privacy Is Expected in an Automobile
Justice Blackmun perpetuated the belief, first promoted in South
Dakota v. Opperman,161 that an individual does not harbor much of
an expectation of privacy in an automobile. That belief has been the
linchpin of many of the recent automobile exception cases. However,
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1989.91.
161. Id. at 1991.
162. 428 U.S. 364, 96 S. Ct. 3092 (1976). See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying
text.
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the belief is actually more of a myth and bears little resemblance to
the truth.
In reality, most Americans expect and require a high degree of
privacy in their automobile. The auto manufacturers, whose business
it is to know what Americans expect in a car, design cars with or
without a trunk. Many trunks require a special key to open them.
Virtually all automobiles have some compartment inside in which to
store personal items. In states where it is legal, many people choose
to spend extra money to have their windows tinted so others may not
see into the vehicle. Some people customize their automobile, purchase
personalized plates, and assemble various bumper stickers to make
vicarious statements to others. Despite high gas prices and immense
traffic problems, most Americans refuse to carpool; they refuse to share
their automobile with others. Many people identify personally with their
automobile; the car itself becomes an extension of their own person-
alities. People often take damage or insult to their car personally.'6 3
For many people, their automobiles are their most valuable assets. 1' 4
People routinely store valuable items in their automobile, especially
while they are "out and about." The car becomes a home away from
home.16S The fact that more valuables are kept in a house does not
163. See, e.g., Cynthia 0. Dettelbach, In the Driver's Seat: The Automobile in
American Literature and Popular Culture 97 (1976) (William Faulkner said, "The Amer-
ican really loves nothing but his automobile."); Ouellette, Cars are Us, Utne Reader 44
(Sept-Oct. 1991); Eisenhandler, The Asphalt Identikit: Old Age and the Driver's License,
30 Int'l J. of Aging & Hum. Dev. 1 (1990) (on the importance of driving to the elderly);
Lyman, Rethinking Our Transportation Future, E Magazine (Sept.-Oct. 1990) at 34;
Karal Ann Marling, America's Love Affair With the Automobile in the Television Age,
146 Design Quarterly 5 (Fall 1989); Donald J. Bush, Emotive Power, 146 Design Quarterly
20 (Fall 1989).
To a degree, the American infatuation with cars has decreased since its modern
peak in the 1950s and 60s. Nevertheless, the common affinity for cars is still uncanny,
and one must note that cars are more widely used now in America than at any other
time.
164. See supra note 3. In general, a household's equity in automobiles is second only
to equity in the home. However, only 64% of American households have equity in a
home, compared to 86% of Americans who have equity in an automobile.
165. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 388 n.6, 96 S. Ct. 3092.
3106 n.6 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (it is customary for people to carry their most
personal and private items in a car from time to time); Martin R. Gardner, Searches
and Seizures of Automobiles and Their Contents: Fourth Amendment Considerations in
a Post-Ross World, 62 Neb. L. Rev. 1, 36 (1983) ("[A]t one time or another, almost
everyone carries these highly private containers in their automobiles.").
It has been suggested that in some ways a car offers more privacy than a home.
Lloyd Weinreb wrote, "Many people resort to their cars, however, for a privacy of
presence and a privacy of place that they lack in crowded living conditions." Lloyd L.
Weinreb, Generalities of the Fourth Amendment, 42 U. Chi. L. Rev. 47, 75.76 (1974).
The automobile exception also applies to motor homes and campers. See, e.g.,
California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 105 S. Ct. 2066 (1985).
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reflect the relative expectations of privacy in a house or automobile.
Rather, most valuables by virtue of their intended usage are found in
the home, for example, computers, televisions, and jewelry. Addition-
ally, houses usually provide more security for protection of the items
against thieves.' 
The legitimate and large expectation of privacy which people do
have in automobiles is not significantly diminished by government reg-
ulation of automobiles. Despite the Court's claims otherwise, regulation
of automobiles does not decrease the individual's expectation of freedom
from pervasive police searches. The government's regulation of auto-
mobiles primarily concerns safety and ownership matters. To drive a
car legally, the driver must infrequently take the car before a gas station
or garage attendant who then checks the brakes, lights, and so forth.
These checks are usually brief and superficially performed. The person
who checks the automobile sits inside the car, if at all, perhaps five
minutes at most to pull various levers and latches. These checks do
not expose the car as a whole to scrutiny, the trunk is not opened,
and the attendant does not check into nooks and crannies inside the
car.
Traffic stops and such by the police are not expected or anticipated
by drivers unless the driver has done something to merit the stop. Even
if a police officer has lawful authority to make random checks, the
average American does not expect a regulatory stop to lead to a police
search throughout the automobile, the trunk, and containers within the
car. If such a search did occur, the citizen would likely view it as
harassment. During ordinary traffic stops, it is expected that the police
officer will approach the side of the car and ask to see a driver's
license."17 Unless contraband is in plain sight of the police officer, or
emits a noticeable odor, an individual does not believe that the police
officer may conduct a general search of the automobile. Furthermore,
to the extent that government regulation or police stops do subject the
automobile to scrutiny, the superficial searches in no way affect the
expectation of privacy in the trunk of the car. One especially does not
expect the police officer to open containers located in the car."6
166. Although there is some correlation between security and expectations of privacy,
one should not conclude that since cars lack the security of a home persons do not
have legitimate expectations of privacy in their automobile. First, fear of a burglary is
much more striking than the fear of the police search of an automobile, especially
considering that a person and his family are at their most vulnerable (i.e., sleeping)
while in a home. Second, if possible, people prefer to place their cars within their house
(i.e., a garage) when the automobile is not in use. The car is then just as secure as the
house.
167. Certain groups may expect a much more thorough search due to police prejudice,
but such police prejudice cannot be held to reduce expectations of privacy in the
automobile.
168. Florida v. Jimeno, Ill S. Ct. 1801, 1805 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting). The
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Clearly, the Court's reliance upon a lack of expectation of privacy
in an automobile is fallacious. Rather than accept the fact that Amer-
icans do indeed expect privacy in their vehicles, the Court has created
a myth. Katz v. United States'69 held that the Fourth Amendment
protects against unreasonable searches in all places where the individual
manifests a legitimate expectation of privacy. The automobile exception
was originally rooted primarily upon the exigency arising from an
automobile's extreme mobility. At variance, Chambers v. Maroney"70
allowed the police to conduct a search even after the automobile had
been immobilized. Therefore, the Court had to find another justification
aside from mobility to uphold the search approved in Chambers. As
a solution, the Court rationalized that an individual's expectation of
privacy'did not strongly attach to his automobile. 7 ' The Court did not
provide much reasoning behind its pronouncement, but did find a
convenient way to dispense with the requirements of the Fourth Amend-
ment. The Court did not frankly and forthrightly announce that the
analysis of automobile searches really revolved upon the conflict between
individuals' privacy rights in their automobiles and the practical needs
of law enforcement. Instead, the Court created a myth that automobiles
are subject to inferior expectations of privacy. This unrealistic approach
easily reconciled the past cases with Katz, but the approach eventually
led to virtual removal of vehicles from the protections of the Fourth
Amendment in Acevedo.
If indeed an individual no longer has any expectation of privacy
in his automobile, it is precisely because of the procession of Supreme
Court rulings which have steadily eroded the Fourth Amendment pro-
tections in a car.'1 2 If true, the Court's entire analysis of automobile
argument that expectations of privacy are eroded by the open-air nature of the automobile
is of no moment. First, the right to privacy is not merely the right to keep an object
secret or hidden. An individual's privacy right also entails the expectation that the object
will be let alone. Although a lunch bag may be visible through the windshield of the
car, the owner still expects that the lunchbag will not be tampered with. In this respect,
the security given to an object may more accurately reflect or coincide with, an individual's
expectation of privacy. Second, assuming arguendo that the Fourth Amendment only
protects secrecy rights, objects within an automobile still remain hidden to an extent
though visible to outside viewers. In other words, the appearance of an object is not
always the best indication of what the object actually is. For instance, a small square
mirror may be a prop for a narcissistic driver or the tool of a cocaine-using passenger.
Only a close inspection of the mirror from inside the automobile could discover which.
People do not always "know it when they see it."
169. 389 U.S. 347, 88 S. Ct. 507 (1967).
170. 399 U.S. 42, 90 S. Ct. 1975 (1970).
171. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 96 S. Ct. 3092 (1976).
172. See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392, 105 S. Ct. 2066, 2070 (1985) ("The
public is fully aware that it is accorded less privacy in its automobiles because of this
compelling governmental need for regulation."). Arguably, the American populace may
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searches has been impermissibly muddied by its own fabrications. The
cart would be pulling the horse, and the Court would essentially be a
panel of self-fulfilling prophets. Indeed, the Court's analysis would
parallel the dangers noted in Smith v. Maryland:'73
For example, if the Government were suddenly to announce
on nationwide television that all homes henceforth would be
subject to warrantless entry, individuals thereafter might not in
fact entertain any actual expectation or [sic] privacy regarding
their homes, papers, and effects.... In such circumstances,
where an individual's subjective expectations had been "con-
ditioned" by influences alien to well-recognized Fourth Amend-
ment freedoms, those subjective expectations obviously could
play no meaningful role in ascertaining what the scope of Fourth
Amendment protection was. In determining whether a "legiti-
mate expectation of privacy" existed in such cases, a normative
inquiry would be proper.' 7'
Practically all modern automobile exception cases could be considered
"alien to well-recognized Fourth Amendment freedoms" since they
relied upon the ipse dixit myth of weak expectations of privacy in an
automobile.
2. Seizure of the Container is Not as Intrusive as the Search
The Court has often argued that probable cause sufficient to seize
the container will nearly always be enough to satisfy a search warrant.
Therefore, the individual has no appreciable privacy interest in requiring
the police to get a search warrant after seizing the container. The
argument presumes that probable cause to seize is equivalent to probable
cause to search. Furthermore, it presumes that a probable cause de-
termination by a magistrate before a search is equivalent to an after-
the-fact judicial review of the police officer's field determination of
probable cause. Neither of these presumptions can withstand scrutiny.
In theory, probable cause remains the same whether the police seize,
search, or arrest. Even so, the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court
suggests that probable cause, as a quantum or standard, does indeed
vary from seizure to search to arrest. If the standard was always the
be presumed to be aware of the rulings of the Supreme Court. Such a presumption is
quite dubious considering that many Americans cannot locate the United States on a
map nor can they identify the Bill of Rights. A recent survey shows that only 33% of
Americans know that the Bill of Rights are the first ten amendments to the Constitution.
Bill of Rights Unfamiliar to Many in U.S., Baton Rouge Morning Advocate, Dec. 15,
1991, at A2, col.2.
173. 442 U.S. 735, 99 S. Ct. 2577 (1979).
174. Id. at 740 n.5, 99 S. Ct. at 2580 n.5.
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same, then the question presented in Acevedo would be moot since the
police could simply arrest Acevedo and then conduct warrantless searches
incident to arrest' 7' or conduct a warrantless inventory search. 76 How-
ever, the Court has implicitly recognized that the quantum does not
remain constant. Instead, Illinois v. Gates'7 describes probable cause
as a "fair probability." The word "fair" connotes a balancing approach
which should consider the relative degree of intrusiveness of the police
activity.
The Court has recognized that various quanta of cause will justify
various degrees of either seizures or searches.' 78 This approach has
measured the importance of the governmental intrusion and the degree
of the intrusion against the individual's right to be left alone. Thus,
under "articulable suspicion" the police may briefly stop an individual
and conduct a pat down search.7 9 Aside from the stop and frisk, the
individual retains his privacy rights. Any further intrusion would require
a warrant.
While various searches and seizures are recognized as increasingly
violative of privacy interests, the Court has also recognized that a
seizure is usually less intrusive than a search.' 80 A seizure of a personal
effect, such as a container, is an intrusion into the individual's pos-
sessory or proprietary interests. At most the individual is deprived of
his property."' On the other hand, the search of that same personal
effect is an intrusion into that person's privacy interest. The search
may ultimately injure his dignity, restrain his liberty, and possibly end
his life. Privacy interests are of much more importance than proprietary
interests."82 Unfortunately, the Court has not yet consistently applied
this dichotomy to search and seizure law. Be that as it may, one can
175. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 101 S. Ct. 2860 (1981).
176. See, e.g., Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 110 S. Ct. 1632 (1990); Colorado v.
Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 107 S. Ct. 738 (1987).
177. 462 U.S. 213, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983).
178. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968).
179. Circumstances which lead a police officer to believe that criminal activity may
be occurring are a "sufficient basis to justify an investigative stop" of an automobile.
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 413, l01 S. Ct. 690, 692 (1981).
180. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 103 S. Ct. 2637 (1983). Of course, some
seizures may in fact be more intrusive than a certain search. Most notably, the seizure
of the person-an arrest-is often at least as intrusive as a search, because a seizure of
the person intrudes upon privacy rights.
181. If this property is obviously contraband or evidence, then a search is not
necessary, and the possessor of the object will likely be immediately arrested and con-
victed. But in the case of containers, the mere seizure of the property cannot convict
the individual since its contents remain unknown to the police.
182. See, e.g., Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 104 S. Ct. 3380 (1984) (pos-
sessory interests are given less Fourth Amendment protection than privacy interests).
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scarcely doubt that, given the differing values at stake, an individual
is much more likely to view a search as more intrusive than a seizure.
Certainly Charles Steven Acevedo would have chosen to allow the seizure
of the lunchbag rather than the later warrantless search.
Therefore, an individual has a greater privacy interest in preventing
the warrantless search of a container than in preventing the warrantless
seizure of the container. This greater privacy interest is deserving of
the constitutional protection of the warrant requirement even in cir-
cumstances in which the warrantless seizure, of the container is necessary.
The fact that warrants will be predominantly forthcoming is of little
consequence to the individual. The privacy interest at stake demands
a constitutional right to judicial supervision and overview-before the
container is searched and its contents made public.
Arguably, whatever privacy interest the individual has in a mag-
istrate's review is outweighed by the inconvenience which the police
would suffer. Since a magistrate will almost always approve the warrant,
requiring the police to detain the container and suspect until the warrant
is issued is simply a waste of the police officers' time, which could be
better spent hunting down more criminals.8 3 However, such detentions
need not last long. Many police departments can phone in warrant
requests, and developing communications technology will only quicken
the warrant process. Warrants can even be issued within one hour.' 8 4
183. The State raised an interesting argument that the detention of an individual
until a warrant is issued or denied will, at some point in time, become essentially an
arrest. Nevertheless, most individuals would usually be better served by the seizure/arrest
than the warrantless search. If the person is truly guilty, he is deserving of an arrest
yet retains the chance that the warrant request will. be denied. If the person is truly
innocent, then his seizure may be quickly ended upon his consent to the warrantless
search. One wonders if such a person could subjectively believe he was "not free to
go"? Recent Supreme Court decisions seem to make these seizures of persons, or
unintentional arrests, like that argued by the State, very elusive. See Florida v. Bostick,
Ill S. Ct. 2382 (1991) and California v. Hodari, III S. Ct. 1547 (1991).
184. In some locales a warrant can be issued in about an hour. See United States
v. Lynch, 934 F.2d 1226, 1233 n.5 (Ilth Cir. 1991) (one hour); United States v. Berick,
710 F.2d 1035, 1037 (5th Cir. 1983) (one to four hours); United States v. Baker, 520
F. Supp. 1080, 1083-84 (S.D. Iowa 1981) (not more than thirty minutes).
In most cases, obtaining a search warrant requires two or three hours, even if using
a telephone. See, e.g., United States v. Good, 780 F.2d 773, 775 (9th Cir. 1986); Llaguno
v. Mingey, 763 F.2d 1560, 1572 (7th Cir. 1985) (en banc). Unquestionably, telephonic
warrants could be made much quicker if certain procedural requirements, such as pos-
sessing an actual affidavit form, were abolished. Other measures could be taken to make
magistrates or other warrant-issuing officials more accessible. It is better to cut corners
on procedure than to do so on substance.
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Furthermore, those individuals who value their time more than their
privacy interest in a container may waive the warrant requirement and
consent to an immediate search. Of course, for those who do not
consent, the police will be required to spend some time-to satisfy the
warrant requirement. But, the police cannot say that their time is too
valuable to recognize a citizen's constitutional right to a magistrate's
approval of the search.' 85
Some practical concerns of the policemen are good arguments against
requiring a warrant. The automobile exception of Carroll was largely
set up in recognition of the concern that the police could not be expected
to detain an automobile until a magistrate could be summoned to issue
a warrant. At that time, police departments did not have the facilities
to store automobiles. Moreover, the time required to get a warrant was
on average much longer than it is today.'8 6 Oppositely, modern police
have adequate facilities to store most containers,8 7 and a lot of time
is not required to get a warrant. 88
Arguably, an after-the-fact judicial review of the police officer's
field determination of probable cause adequately protects the indivi-
dual's privacy interest in the container. Far from it, such a review of
probable cause has many infirmities which a magistrate's prior deter-
mination does not. 9 First, the after-the-fact review may be jaded by
the magistrate's knowledge of the result of the search. A person may
be more likely to find probable cause to search the container of a
known criminal rather than of a suspected criminal. Second, the reviewer
will likely have knowledge of other information surrounding the case
which would not have been known to the police or the magistrate at
the time of the search. For instance, the reviewer will know of evidence
which shows the breadth and severity of the crime. A person may be
185. Martin R. Gardner, Searches and Seizures of Automobiles and their Contents:
Fourth Amendment Considerations in a Post-Ross World, 62 Neb. L. Rev. 1, 43 (1983)
("Promoting effective law enforcement per se is an insufficient reason for sacrificing
constitutionally protected interests.").
186. Today, police may use a telephone to submit a warrant. Even in overworked
metropolitan judicial systems, a search warrant can be obtained within four hours.
187. See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 765 n.14, 99 S. Ct. 2586, 2594 n.14
(1979). Given the seeming wide-spread use of inventory searches, modern police also
have adequate facilities to store seized automobiles.
188. Indeed, under Shadwick v. Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 92 S. Ct. 2119 (1972), the
probable cause determination may be made by a wider variety of personages. This further
aids the rapid issuance of a warrant.
189. "[Aln on-the-spot determination of probable cause is never the same as a decision
by a neutral and detached magistrate." United States v. Ross. 456 U.S. 798, 833-34,
102 S. Ct. 2157, 2177 (1982) (Marshall, J.,dissenting).
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more likely to find probable cause to search the container of a courier
of a large criminal organization than of a casual user of narcotics."9°
Third, the review of probable cause takes place in the context of the
exclusionary rule."' If the reviewer decides that the police did not have
probable cause to search the container, the case will likely fail against
the offender. Often the opportunity to bring the offender to justice
will have been permanently lost. The magistrate who gives prior review
to a warrant does not face such a dilemma. If the magistrate decides
that the police do not have probable cause, the potential offender goes
free, but the entire case against that offender has not been ruined. The
government has not yet spent many hours and effort to build a case
against the person. Often the police still retain a good opportunity to
apprehend the individual later."' It is beyond dispute that our nation's
judges try with all their strength to remain impartial when they decide
issues such as probable cause. Nevertheless, the after-the-fact reviewer
must fight the natural inclinations described above. Most judges are
quite aware of the innate prejudices created by an after-the-fact judicial
review, and these judges steadfastly uphold the Fourth Amendment even
when it causes them personal grief to free a known criminal. However,
over time-in the aggregate-it is likely that some reviews will be jaded
to the.detriment of an individual's Fourth Amendment rights.
3. Chadwick and Sanders Were Not Confusing
Justice Blackmun in Acevedo argued that Chadwick and Sanders
had created confusion for all concerned. The State and its supporters
made much ado about the so-called absurdity of requiring police, on
one hand, to get a warrant to search containers in which there exists
particular probable cause. Meanwhile, the police may conduct a war-
rantless search of the entire automobile, including containers, if there
exists general probable cause that the automobile contains contraband.
According to Justice Blackmun, "The Chadwick-Sanders rule not only
has failed to protect privacy but it has also confused courts and police
officers and impeded effective law enforcement." '3 However, it is highly
questionable whether Justice Blackmun's conclusions have any basis in
fact or are mere rhetoric.
190. See, e.g., Ross, 456 U.S. at 829, 102 S. Ct. at 2175 (Marshall, J., dissenting);
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 565, 96 S. Ct. 3074, 3086 (1976); South
Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 383, 96 S. Ct. 3092, 3104 (1976) (Powell, J.,
concurring); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96, 85 S. Ct. 223, 228 (1964).
191. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684 (1961); Weeks v. United States,
232 U.S. 383, 34 S. Ct. 341 (1914).
192. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 455 n.22, 96 S. Ct. 820, 843 n.22
(1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
193. California v. Acevedo, Ill S. Ct. 1982, 1989 (1991).
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Justice Stevens astutely points out that Justice Blackmun provided
no evidence that the police were confused by the rule of Chadwick-
Sanders and its potential conflict with the holding of Ross. Justice
Stevens retorted that the authority upon which the Court had found
the confusion was:
primarily . . . predictions that were made by Justice Blackmun
in his dissenting opinions in Chadwick and Sanders. The Court,
however, cites no evidence that these predictions have in fact
materialized or that anyone else has been unable to understand
the "inherent opaqueness," . . . of this uncomplicated issue. 194
The finding of confusion among law enforcement officers was probably
a myth or self-fulfilling prophecy. It is very questionable that well-
trained policemen would find it difficult to determine when there is
general probable cause as to the entire automobile or when there is
probable cause particular to a container. Certainly some police in the
field today do not have the ability to make accurate probable cause
determinations, but this is much more a reflection of inadequate training
than a lack of capacity. 91
Often the nature of probable cause is abundantly clear. In Acevedo
it was clear that the police only had probable cause to search the
lunchbag. Chadwick and Sanders were similarly clear. And in cases like
Carroll and Ross the police were clearly interested in illegal activities
taking place in or from the automobile and not in any specific container.
As a rule of thumb, the question could be easily resolved by asking
which object the police became aware of first-the vehicle or the
container. The Supreme Court plainly adopted this rule of thumb in
Johns regardless of contradictory circumstances. Therefore, the deter-
mination of whether Ross or Chadwick would apply was relatively clear
cut. Of course, some cases would fall in the gray area between the
two cases. But Johns certainly showed that Ross controlled the gray
area searches. Given such guidance by the Supreme Court, police would
have to be a very dull lot to remain confused.
Likewise, it is questionable that the lower courts were confused.
Justice Blackmun pointed to what he considered a large number of
194. Id. at 2000 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
195. See Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 838-39, 104 S. Ct. 3380, 3403 (1984)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The image of the 'keystone cop' ... is largely a matter of
memory. .. ").
Justice Blackmun would have it believed that police officers are unskilled in legal
nuances and simply cannot operate without "bright-line rules." To the contrary, many
police officers understand the legal standards better than the bulk of attorneys. If those
officers are the rare exception and police generally are hopelessly confused by Ross and
Chadwick, then America is in much more danger than even this writer supposed.
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Fourth Amendment cases heard after Chadwick as a sign of turmoil
among the ranks. Even so, the number of cases heard by the Supreme
Court is not an accurate measure of confusion in the lower courts.
First, according to the rules of appeal, the Court basically determines
for itself which cases it will hear. Second, the number of search and
seizure cases is more likely a measure of the Supreme Court's recent
activism. Justice Stevens stated it best:
In recent Terms, the Court has displayed little confidence
in state and lower federal court decisions that purport to enforce
the Fourth Amendment. Unless an order suppressing evidence
is clearly correct, a petition for certiorari is likely to garner
the four votes required for a grant of *plenary review ....
Much of the Court's "burdensome" workload is a product of
its own aggressiveness in this area. By promoting the Supreme
Court of the United States as the High Magistrate for every
warrantless search and seizure, this practice has burdened the
argument docket .... It has also encouraged state legal officers
to file petitions for certiorari in even the most frivolous search
and seizure cases.'%
Third, the number of narcotics cases which have entered the judicial
system has increased dramatically since the Court decided Chadwick
nearly fifteen years ago.'97 It is only natural that a result of this increase
of cases entering the docket would be an increase in the number of
cases which are appealed to and heard by the Supreme Court.
Even if the lower courts were occasionally confused or indecisive,
effective law enforcement was not hindered. All the cases which reached
the Supreme Court, including Acevedo, were decided in favor of the
government. Not a single accused went free because the Court found
a warrantless search to be unconstitutional where either Chadwick or
Ross might apply. 9 Furthermore, there is no evidence that judicial
indecision leads to ineffective day-to-day law enforcement. No case has
196. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 396, 105 S. Ct. 2066, 2071-72 (1985) (Stevens,
J., dissenting). See also Florida v. Meyers, 466 U.S. 380, 384-85, 104 S. Ct. 1852, 1855
(1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
197. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. at 2002 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Annual Report of
the Attorney General of the United States 21 (1989)).
198. In the Supreme Court, only Ross and Acevedo presented the question of con-
tainers found in an automobile, and both cases were decided in the government's favor.
But of twenty-seven cases heard by the Court after Ross involving a search or seizure
without a warrant or with a defective warrant where the government was the petitioner,
the Court upheld the search or seizure twenty:four times. Id. at 2002 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
The Courts of Appeals also overwhelmingly sided with the government in cases
involving the warrantless search of a container found in an automobile. Only one of
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ever been reported where a police officer allowed a suspect to escape
while pondering the most recent debates between judges.
Assuming arguendo that the conflict between Chadwick-Sanders and
Ross did confuse the, police and courts, there is no compelling reason
to jettison Chadwick and Sanders and expand Ross. Even a cursory
review of the two lines of precedents reveals that Chadwick and Sanders
derive their justification from the text of the Fourth Amendment itself.
On the other hand, Ross derives its justification from an exception to
the Fourth Amendment based upon pragmatic concerns of the Court.
To prefer the rule of Ross is to allow the exception to master the basic
rule.' This makes no sense. In the beginning, the Fourth Amendment
provided the clearest "bright line" for a reasonable search-get a
warrant. Over time, as American society gained access to rapid trans-
portation, it became clear that in some circumstances getting a warrant
just was not practicable if the police were to be effective in their jobs.
So in Carroll the Court wisely established an automobile exception
based upon the mobility of the vehicle and the impracticability of getting
a warrant under the circumstances. If any uncertainty existed, it was
the inevitable price to be exacted by the creation of an exception. A
widely-accepted principle of constitutional adjudication mandated that
the Court must not interpret any exception more broadly than required
by its justification. 2 0 Therefore, if there is conflict between Chadwick
and Ross, the proper solution is to curtail the exceptional case-Ross.
Unfortunately, the Court felt compelled to do just the opposite.
Perhaps the most ironic and disturbing aspect of the Acevedo
decision is that it discards the supposed probable cause "anomaly" of
sixteen decisions sided with the individual. United States v. Salazar, 805 F.2d 1394 (9th
Cir. 1986). The remainder sided with the government. United States v. Crotinger, 928
F.2d 203 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Maguire, 918 F.2d 254 (1st Cir. 1990); United
States v. Muniz-Melchor, 894 F.2d 1430 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. Barrett, 890
F.2d 855 (6th Cir. 1989); United States v. Mayer, 875 F.2d 871 (9th Cir. 1989) (Table)
(unpublished); United States v. Walsh, 869 F.2d 1494 (6th Cir. 1989) (Table) (unpub-
lished); United States v. Sanchez, 861 F.2d 89 (5th Cir. 1988); United States v. Carter,
842 F.2d 335 (9th Cir. 1988) (Table) (unpublished); United States v. Williams, 822 F.2d
1174 (D.C. Cir. 1987); United States v. Reyes, 792 F.2d 536 (5th Cir. 1986); United
States v. Caroline, 791 F.2d 197 (D.C. Cir. 1986); United States v. Mazzone, 782 F.2d
757 (7th Cir. 1986); United States v. Adams, 780 F.2d 1023 (6th Cir. 1985) (Table)
(unpublished); United States v. Shepherd, 714 F.2d 316 (4th Cir. 1983); United States
v. Freire, 710 F.2d 1515 (11th Cir. 1983).
199. See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 396, 105 S. Ct. 2066, 2071 (1985)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
200. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 464, 101 S. Ct. 2860, 2866 (1981)
(Brennan, J., dissenting); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 760, 99 S. Ct. 2586, 2591
(1979); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393, 98 S. Ct. 2408, 2414 (1978); Coolidge
v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 2032 (1971); Chambers v.
Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 61, 90 S. Ct. 1975, 1986 (1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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Chadwick and Sanders and replaces it with a much more threatening
and senseless anomaly. Though Acevedo would allow the warrantless
search of a suitcase full of marijuana once it was placed inside a locked
car trunk, the police could not search this very same suitcase as it was
being carried through the public streets. Justice Stevens wrote:
One's privacy interest in one's luggage can certainly not be
diminished by one's removing it from a public thoroughfare
and placing it-out of sight-in a privately owned vehicle. Nor
is the danger that evidence will escape increased if the luggage
is in a car rather than on the street.... Any line demarking
an exception to the warrant requirement will appear blurred at
the edges, but the Court has certainly erred if it believes that,
by erasing one line and drawing another, it has drawn a clearer
boundary.20l
One wonders if the Court will next use this anomaly to justify the
warrantless search of containers found anywhere except perhaps a pri-
vate residence. After all, in a few years, looking back at Acevedo, it
will be easy for the Court simply to say if in cars, why not elsewhere?
B. Poor Policy Choices
1. Acevedo: A Bull in the China Shop
The balance between Ross and Chadwick was not confusing and
did not create anomalies. But assuming arguendo that the jurisprudence
was unwieldy, the new rule announced in Acevedo is a poor replacement.
201. California v. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. 1982, 2001 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Even Chief Justice Rehnquist has been known to speak against the efficacy of bright-
lines. See Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420. 443, 101 S. Ct. 2841, 2854 (1981)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). For a strong criticism of the use of bright-line tests, see
Albert W. Alschuler, Bright Line Fever and the Fourth Amendment, 45 U. Pitt. L. Rev.
227 (1984).
Professor LaFave has been a vocal supporter of bright-lines, but even he has
recognized the potential problems: "[A] line that is bright is not necessarily also right."
Wayne R. LaFave, Constitutional Rules for Police: A Matter of Style, 41 Syracuse L.
Rev. 849, 855 (1990). Professor LaFave offers four criteria to rate a bright-line rule:
1) Does it have clear boundaries so it makes case-by-case evaluation unnec-
essary?
2) Does it approximate results which would have been determined in a case-
by-case application of the underlying principle if such were practicable?
3) Is it responsive to a genuine need to forego a case-by-case application of
a principle?
4) Is it immune from manipulation and abuse?
Although Acevedo may satisfy the first criterion, the decision fails to meet the
professor's three remaining tests.
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The rule does not withstand scrutiny under either a test of "fundamental
fairness" or a test of "reasonableness." The rule is improper because
it introduces a high chance of error that innocent parties will be ad-
versely affected, subjecting these individuals to quite severe damages
and indignities. Meanwhile, the governmental interest in expanding war-
rantless automobile searches is truly not high. When these concerns are
balanced, it becomes clear that the rule introduces more harm than
good.
Acevedo increases the risk that the government will intrude upon
the privacy of innocent people. Acevedo inflicts upon the nation a rule
which essentially places automobiles beyond the scope of the Fourth
Amendment. 2 This rule will have far-reaching effects upon the rights
of all people who drive automobiles in America. Most of these people
will not be aware that no object within an automobile is beyond a
police officer's power to search without a warrant. 20 3 Acevedo goes
beyond the scope of Ross. Although Justice Blackmun denied that
Acevedo extends the previous authority of the police to conduct war-
rantless searches, the decision ultimately will allow police to search the
entire car even where probable cause is attached to, only a specific
container within the car.204 Dicta in Ross suggested that such searches
would not be permitted, but the Court has not since taken any actions
to suggest that the words were anything more than posturing. 0 In the
real world, who would actually stop the search short after discovering
202. "Were federal officers free to search without a warrant merely upon probable
cause ... the provisions of the Fourth Amendment would become empty phrases, and
the protection it affords largely nullified." Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 498,
78 S. Ct. 1253, 1257 (1958).
203. See supra note 172.
204. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. at 1991. For instance, suppose a police officer stops Mr.
X for running a yellow light. Mr. X seems disoriented, and there is a faint odor of
marijuana. The officer sees a cigar box in the passenger's seat with the tip of a rolled
cigarette sticking out. The police officer has probable .cause to believe that marijuana
is located in the cigar box. He may suspect that other illegal remnants can be found
throughout Mr. X's car, but he does not have probable cause as to the rest of the car,
unless the Court is now prepared to allow utter bootstrapping, in which case the police
may as well search Mr. X's home too. Nevertheless, Acevedo would likely allow the
warrantless search of the entire car. If the cigar box does contain marijuana then Mr.
X may be arrested and his car may be taken to the police station and subjected to a
warrantless inventory search. Therefore, Mr. X would not be constitutionally injured by
a warrantless search of the entire car under Acevedo. If the cigar box does not contain
marijuana, the police officer has probable cause to believe that the marijuana is located
elsewhere in the car. Either way, after Acevedo, Mr. X's entire car may be searched by
the police officer in the field without a warrant. For a case with similar facts, see Berry
v. State, 574 N.E.2d 960 (Ind. App. 1st Dist. 1991).
205. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2172 (1982) ("Probable
cause to believe that a container placed in the trunk of a taxi contains contraband or
evidence does not justify a search of the entire cab.").
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the illegal contents of the container? Acevedo says that the search of
any container found within an automobile falls within the purview of
the automobile exception. Ross held that the scope of a search following
the automobile exception is precisely the same as the scope of a search
authorized by a warrant.
If the police know that a person has carried a lunchbag of marijuana
into his house, the magistrate will issue a warrant to search for con-
traband throughout the house regardless of the form of packaging. It
is unlikely that the magistrate would limit the object of the search to
a "lunchbag of marijuana."' 2 6 The warrant would authorize the police
to search for contraband anywhere within the house which could contain
marijuana. And the police officer would not end the search upon finding
a bag of marijuana on the kitchen table. In the same manner, upon
introduction of a bag of contraband into an automobile, under Acevedo,
the police may search throughout the car in any areas which might
conceal the contraband.
Clearly the Court has expanded the automobile exception far beyond
its original rational justifications. Acevedo weakens the Fourth Amend-
ment to the detriment of every person in the United States. Additionally,
the decision places Americans at risk in a less obvious, though perhaps
ultimately more threatening, way. When police can conduct a warrantless
search on the basis of plainly innocuous activities like Acevedo's, it is
likely that many innocent persons will be subjected to similar, and even
more severe, searches. It is debatable whether probable cause existed
to search Acevedo. -Taken at face value, Acevedo behaved much more
like a person coming home for a lunch break than a criminal. Acevedo
arrived around noon and entered the apartment without knocking. The
police did not know who he was, nor did the police know who resided
in the apartment. Acevedo stayed inside for about ten minutes and
then left carrying a lunchbag. He placed this bag in his trunk. Despite
the assertions of the police, the lunchbag was not the same size as the
packages of marijuana seen earlier in Hawaii. Acevedo's bag was only
one-fourth the size of the'packages seen in Hawaii and Santa Ana by
Officer Coleman. Nor did the lunchbag feel or smell of marijuana.
Acevedo's only suspicious activity was that he briefly entered an apart-
ment under surveillance by the police. Acevedo was guilty by association.
Undoubtedly, each'day thousands of people unwittingly come into
206. For example, in Acevedo, the warrant issued to Officer Coleman authorized the
search of Daza's apartment and car for "[mlarijuana and items commonly associated
with storage and use of marijuana consisting of sifters, baggies, scales and other weighing
devices." Any of those items could be located anywhere, and in practically anything,
within the apartment or car. Joint Appendix at 12, California v. Acevedo, III S. Ct.
1982 (No. 89-1690).
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contact with nefarious activity. If Acevedo is any indication, in the
future these innocent people will be subject to warrantless searches of
their entire car and whatever containers are inside.207
The increased risk to innocent individuals created by the rule of
Acevedo must be multiplied by the severity of the damage which these
individuals would suffer. The Court continues to hold out the seat-
slashing search conducted in Carroll as a paragon of reasonableness.
Thus, the search may be quite intrusive in terms of property damage,
and this damage must be borne by the car owner who has no recourse
against the police officers. 08 Likewise, the damage inflicted upon an
individual's privacy is very considerable. Under Acevedo, the police
may search the entire automobile in any place which could conceal the
object of the search. A warrantless search of an automobile could reveal
any number of items aside from the object of the search. The police
may discover personal items, may open packages and gifts, and may
uncover embarrassing items. 209
207. Furthermore, the safety and rights of many completely innocent citizens who
have done absolutely nothing to arouse the suspicion of the police will be put at risk
by Acevedo. Since the search of containers within automobiles is uniformly beyond
meaningful Fourth Amendment scrutiny, the police will have an incentive to allow suspects
to enter a vehicle before trying a search. When the police allow a suspect to enter a
vehicle, the police create a situation which stimulates high speed chases through the busy
streets of America. These chases very often end in extreme damage and fatalities to
completely innocent citizens and our policemen who happen to be at the wrong place
at the wrong time as a squad car caroms over a sidewalk. Also, during a chase, or in
the time it takes to pull over the' automobile, the suspect may destroy evidence or even
escape from the reach of the law.
In the past, the Court has warned that police cannot purposefully manipulate an
exception to the Fourth Amendment, but a survey of the automobile exception cases
suggests that the Court will not vigilantly enforce this warning. For example, why did
the police allow Acevedo to enter his car? The Court never asked for an explanation.
208. The Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983, created a federal statutory
cause of action against state officers who violated federal constitutional rights. Bivens
v. Six Unknown Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S. Ct. 1999 (1971), inferred from the Con-
stitution a parallel cause of action against federal officers who violated one's Fourth
Amendment rights. Of course, a key element of the cause of action is a violation of
the Fourth Amendment. Since Acevedo curtails the protections of the Fourth Amendment
from automobiles, the individual's tort claim against the officer has been eliminated.
For a provocative look at the use of tort remedies as constitutional safeguards, see
Robert L. Spurrier, Jr., Rights, Wrongs, and Remedies: Section 1983 and Constitutional
Rights Vindications (1986).
209. The fact that enclosed packages may have no chance of containing the contraband
would likely be of little consequence. Such a basis in reality has often been ignored by
the Court in order to help law enforcement. For example, during an arrest, the police
may search the immediate area without a warrant. Ostensibly, the search is allowed so
police may protect themselves by discovering weapons and to prevent the destruction of
evidence. However, the Court will allow the use of searches incident to an arrest even
under circumstances where the arrestee has no way of moving, e.g., handcuffed and in
the back of a squad car.
19921 1251
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
The searches may also discover condemning and illegal items which
the police did not expect. Such a windfall would be entirely good
evidence for a later prosecution since the police discovered the items
during a lawful search.210 While the police would certainly discover
more law breakers by using Acevedo-type automobile searches, the
traditional American sense of justice is denigrated by such unfocused
law enforcement. Those individuals unfortunate enough to arouse the
suspicion of the police must withstand a warrantless, scrutinizing search
of their entire vehicle and hope nothing incriminating is found. Those
who are in more frequent contact with the police or who live in higher
crime areas are thus held to a high standard of behavior previously
reserved for parolees.2"' One momentary indiscretion or betrayal of trust
may quickly lead to incarceration. Arguably, since those individuals did
break the law, they deserve punishment. But American justice requires
that law breakers be apprehended according to lawful procedures. A
principle of lawful procedure requires that the police search a suspect
only upon a particular and individual cause. Suspicious activity alone
should not be a pretext for a penetrating search aimed at rooting out
any potential wrongdoing. A police search is not a device to be used
to discover sinners wholesale, but is a method of collecting physical
evidence of a particular crime."' This principle was embodied in the
Fourth Amendment, and it is a principle which Acevedo ignores.
The increased number of intrusive searches of innocent persons
must be countered by equal state interests in order for the rule of
Acevedo to be reasonable. Without a doubt, the need to fight crime
is a very important state interest. Indeed, the state interest is probably
greater today than at any other time in our nation's history. However,
Acevedo makes unnecessary changes which do not significantly advance
crime fighting goals. First, as discussed earlier in section IV.A.3.,
Acevedo will not cure any confusion which was impeding law enforce-
ment. No such confusion existed. Second, law enforcement agents did
210. See, e.g., Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 110 S. Ct. 2301 (1990); Arizona
v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 107 S. Ct. 1149 (1987).
211. Despite better trained police officers, many policemen still operate with deeply
held prejudices. See, e.g., Richard Lacayo, Law and Disorder, Time, April 1, 1991, at
18, 20 ("To [many police officers], virtually any young black male with a gold chain
is a potential drug courier. Any well-dressed black man in an expensive car might be a
big time dealer.").
212. Sadly, millions of Americans are outraged when foreign fishermen kill dolphins
in oversized nets designed to catch tuna, while hardly an outcry is raised when decisions
like Acevedo aid American police in the use of analogous indiscriminate, net-like searches
on "born-criminal" American citizens.
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not need carte blanche authority to make warrantless searches of au-
tomobiles. Under Ross the police could usually search the containers
found in automobiles without a warrant. The police needed a warrant
only in situations when they operated under probable cause regarding
a specific container. This was not a major restriction upon the power
of the police to fight crime effectively. In practice, there are only
relatively few instances when the officer knows with particularity where
the contraband is located. Furthermore, these few instances are precisely
the circumstances which most demand a warrant before the search.
Usually, the offender has been under surveillance for a time sufficient
for the police to gain particular knowledge of the contraband's loca-
tion-certainly time enough to make arrangements for a warrant. In
other cases, the officer has gained particular knowledge from an in-
formant. Surely we desire a magistrate's scrutiny of probable cause
supplied by an informant before invading an individual's right to pri-
vacy. And lastly, as in Acevedo, occasionally the officer has probable
cause regarding an illegal object, and suddenly this object or part of
it appears to be escaping via some sort of container, which is then
abruptly placed inside an automobile. Certainly, such instances are rare,
especially when the police are performing their jobs properly. The nature
of the probable cause in these cases is not completely clear, so the
scrutiny of a magistrate is again needed."'
One must note that the state interest in fighting crime has changed
since the 1920s. The risks to individuals created by Carroll were balanced
by the very strong state need to conduct searches of the mobile vehicle
itself, particularly considering the lack of an alternative to a speedy
warrantless search on the Spot. 214 But no strong state need justifies the
search of containers as authorized by Acevedo. Moreover, unlike the
situation in Carroll, today a viable alternative does exist. The police
may seize the container and then get a search warrant. Usually, it would
also be necessary to detain the suspect until a magistrate issues a
warrant. Further, with modern technology the request and issuance of
a warrant need not take much time.2"
Justice Stevens concluded his dissent with this vexed foresight: "It
is too early to know how much freedom America has lost today. The
magnitude of the loss is, however, not nearly as significant as the
Court's willingness to inflict it without even a colorable basis for its
213. Of course, the police need not let the item escape. The police should properly
stop the car and seize the container. However, a magistrate should be consulted before
opening the container since the police are not sure if the container does in fact contain
the item.
214. The era of Prohibition also had a profound effect upon the Carroll Court. See
Murchison, supra note 4, at 496-502, 524.
215. See supra notes 184-188 and accompanying text.
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rejection of prior law." 16 The prior Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
had reflected a delicate balance between the interests of law enforcement
and individual rights. At times the jurisprudence was difficult to apply
and navigate, but its great value and the fear of destroying the balance
necessitated extra concentration and caution by our nation's judges.
Unfortunately, the current Court has loosened a rampant bull in the
Fourth Amendment china shop. Acevedo is the latest piece of china
to fall and crash on the floor.
2. Bad Solution to War on Drugs
It really does not require much insight to understand that the rule
of Acevedo 'is primarily designed to make the policing, arrest, and
conviction of drug possessors and dealers easier. One cannot honestly
question that the containers in question are most likely to contain either
illegal drugs or nothing incriminating at all. Once one cuts through the
arguments of the various Justices for the majority, it remains that the
primary justification for the warrantless search is to aid the "War on
Drugs."
Certainly America faces a drug crisis. Use of illegal drugi saps the
productivity of our citizens, disrupts families, and drives many people
to commit other crimes to support their drug habit. The drug trade
creates a tremendous windfall profit for those who can fight their way
to gain so-called "turf." The result is a war on the streets which leads
to thousands of fatalities among the drug sellers and users as well as
innocent parties who happen to be in the wrong place at the wrong
time. Many brave police officers have also lost their lives. There is no
question that drugs present a national crisis. The question is how to
deal with the crisis. Law enforcement is certainly one important measure
which must be taken. However, it is not the only measure and must
be used along with education and treatment. The leaders of our country
have come to recognize that drugs are a health problem and not just
a legal problem.
Acevedo, no doubt, encourages and aids very aggressive law en-
forcement against drug possessors. But the Court's decision promotes
a one-dimensional assault on drugs. This approach has failed in the
past and will fail in the future." 7 Last year, over 800,000 people were
arrested on drug charges. Catching the drug possessors is not the
problem. The problem for the criminal justice system is that many of
those people who were arrested do not go to prison. And those who
216. California v. Acevedo, III S. Ct. 1982, 2003 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
217. See A. Morgan Cloud, Cocaine, Demand, and Addiction: A Study of the Possible
Convergence of Rational Theory and National Policy, 42 Vand. L. Rev. 725 (1989);
Steven Wisotsky, Exposing the War on Cocaine: The Futility and Destructiveness of
Prohibition, 1983 Wis. L. Rev. 1305 (1983).
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do go to prison stay there for less than a year and a half on average. 218
The criminal justice system just cannot handle this large mass of of-
fenders. Acevedo offers no cure for this and may even make the problem
more acute.
The "War on Drugs" must be a multi-dimensional coordinated
effort. By increasing police ability to arrest and convict drug possessors,
Acevedo allows the law enforcement dimension to become too powerful
and broad. Overly powerful law enforcement disrupts coordinated ef-
forts by providing a simple and supposedly effective solution. In the
long run this will defeat our purposes and goals.
C. Harmful Results
1. Constable Blunders or Constable Batters
The flawed assumptions and poor policy decisions of the Court's
majority led to a holding in Acevedo which will in time harm American
society much more than any immediate benefits of a placated Justice
Department. This comment has already mentioned that the rule of
Acevedo encourages the police to allow suspects to enter their vehicles
in order to have any subsequent search fall under the Ross/Acevedo
automobile exception. The results are property damage, the loss of
evidence, and the escape of criminals. Acevedo also drastically limits
the possibility of a civil claim for damages resulting from police searches
of an automobile or any container within the vehicle.2 1 9 While such
results are certainly harmful, the truly ominous repercussions of the
Acevedo decision attack the very core of American society.
The majority decision in Acevedo states that individuals have no
meaningful expectation of privacy in their automobiles. The Court rules
that the police may search our automobiles and anything found within
them. The only protection for the citizen, be he good or evil, guilty
or innocent, is a finding of probable cause that the vehicle somehow
harbors evidence of a crime. Beyond a good faith finding of probable
cause by the police in the field, the citizen lies prostrate and defenseless
before the police search and seizure of his property and person2 0
218. The median term served in prison before release was 15 months in 1987. Since
1970 the median has ranged between 14 and 19 months. Patrick A. Langan, America's
Soaring Prison Population, 251 Science 1568, 1570 (1991) (Table 1). After taking into
account the probabilities of arrest, prosecution, conviction, and imprisonment, a person
who commits a serious crime can expect to spend about eight days in prison. Ed
Rubenstein, Crime Pays, National Review, June 25, 1990, at 15.
219. See supra note 208.
220. The Court by.passes the protective aspects of warrants. First, the judicial warrant
provides the detached scrutiny of a neutral magistrate, which is a more reliable safeguard
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A determination of probable cause made by the police in the field
is simply not enough in most cases to protect individual rights reason-
ably. The police have the unenviable task of ferreting out crime and
operate under extreme pressure. Not surprisingly, the rigors of the job
leads dutiful officers to becoming impassioned. Often the police view
themselves as -heroes upon white horses while the suspects are equally
evil, rotten to the core, and worthy of righteous contempt. All too
often the haze of the city streets becomes the set of a morality play.
The fever of the law enforcer is pervasive throughout the system,
affecting even the most even-natured police officer from time to time.22'
The result is that the individual citizen who is spotted in suspicious
circumstances becomes the victim of self-righteous police prejudice of
unparalleled intensity. The police are accountable mainly only through
Section 1983 actions, which the Acevedo Court has essentially removed
as a public remedy.
It should also be noted that the quantum needed to establish prob-
able cause has been steadily eroding. At one time the legal community
thought that probable cause meant "more likely than not." However,
recent cases like Illinois v. Gates2' have set the quantum at a "fair
probability" that the citizen has engaged in a crime. Moreover, upon
review of a magistrate's finding, the standard is further reduced to a
"substantial basis" of a "fair probability. "22 3 So under current law,
if a citizen behaves in a manner which leads a police officer to believe
that in fair probability connects that person to a crime, then that citizen
may be arrested. If a magistrate issued a warrant, evidence found during
a search may be used against the individual-and may even convict
against improper and unreasonable searches than the hurried judgment of a law en-
forcement officer. See United States v. Chadwick. 433 U.S. I, 9, 97 S. Ct. 2476. 2482
(1977); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 383, 96 S. Ct. 3092, 3104 (1976);
United States v. United States Dist. Court for Eastern Dist. of Michigan, 407 U.S. 297,
317, 92 S. Ct. 2125, 2136 (1972); Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 252, 80 S. Ct.
683, 704 (1960) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Second, once a lawful search has begun, it is
more likely that the search will not exceed proper and reasonable bounds when the search
is conducted following judicial authorization. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S.
1, 9, 97 S. Ct. 2476, 2482 (1977); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532, 87
S. Ct. 1727, 1732-33 (1967). Third, the warrant assures the individual whose property
is searched or seized of the lawful authority of the executing officer, of his needs to
search, and the limits of his power to search. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798,
829, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2175 (1982) (Marshall, J., dissenting); United States v. Chadwick.
433 U.S. i, 9, 97 S. Ct. 2476, 2482 (1977).
221. See, e.g., Ted Gest, Why Brutality Persists, U.S. News & World Report, April
1, 1991, at 24, 26 ("[Mlany officers develop an us-against-them mindset .... "); Richard
Lacayo, Law and Disorder, Time, April 1, 1991, at 18, 21 ("Experts on police psychology
insist that most officers are attracted to police work by the opportunity to protect and
serve.").
222. 462 U.S. 213, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983).
223. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271, 80 S. Ct. 725, 736 (1960).
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him-where the search was justified only by a substantial basis of
probable cause. One wonders whether the warrantless search of an
automobile authorized by Acevedo will also receive the benefit of a
"substantial basis" or "good faith" standard.
So, in all honesty, a citizen's constitutional right to a finding of
probable cause has been emasculated and reduced almost to a point
where probable cause is devoid of any substantive content. One might
agree that such a construction of probable cause makes good sense in
the context of a courtroom, which is loathe to exclude convicting
evidence. Our judges are usually of strong heart and mind such that
they can properly balance the needs of society and the rights of the
individual. And when the judge fails, the defendant has able counsel
present to help prevent mistakes and, if necessary, secure an appeal.
But this same construction of probable cause is a threat to all citizens
when in the hands of the police. The police are actively engaged in
the heated task of ferreting out crime and cannot be expected to fully
take into account the rights of their suspects. The beating given by
several Los Angeles policemen to Rodney King sadly reminds us of
this basic truth. 24 Suspects do not have attorneys present in the trunks
of their automobile to protect their interests.
The issue is not about excluding incriminating evidence to the benefit
of lawbreakers. The true issue ignored by the majority in Acevedo is
in empowering the police to detain any person, search throughout the
vehicle, and ransack any personal items found within, all upon the
police officer's own determination of probable cause made in the field
and in the heat of passion. The Founding Fathers and the Court long
ago recognized the danger of this fervor and required the police to get
a warrant from a neutral magistrate whenever practicable. The reasoning
was sound those many years ago; today, with a decreased quantum
necessary for probable cause, the reasoning is even more sound. The
current Court ignored this danger and instead chose to place the privacy
of all individuals who use automobiles into the sweaty hands of Amer-
ica's law enforcement agents.
2. Emergence of a Police State
Perhaps even more frightening is the possible emergence of a police
state, which may be foreshadowed by Acevedo. A police state exists
where the police have unrestrained authority to ignore personal liberties
in their quest to incarcerate all criminals. The current Court has con-
224. See, e.g., Alex Prud'Homme, Police Brutality, Time, March 25, 1991, at 16;
Bill Turque, Brutality on the Beat, Newsweek, March 25, 1991, at 32; Beating Crime,
The Economist, March 23, 1991, at A28(2); Ted Gest, Police Brutality, U.S. News and
World Report, March 18, 1991, at 24.
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sistently sought to improve police and prosecutorial efficiency to the
detriment of a slowly dissolving Bill of Rights. 22' If the Court believes
that the end of ridding our streets of criminals and drugs is worth
these chosen means, then it is in great error. A similar approach has
been tried before and has failed. The police state does not end crime;
instead, the common citizen is inevitably subjected to State tyranny,
usually leading to revolution and rebellion. A brief examination of the
criminal justice system of the recently dissolved Soviet Union will offer
a clear example of a police state which has failed.226 The reader is
invited to notice the similarities between the Soviet criminal justice
system and the American criminal justice system which Acevedo aspires
to create.
Many commentators have argued that the Constitution of the Soviet
Union guaranteed the political, civil, economic, and social rights of its
citizens more clearly and in more abundant measure than any other
constitution on Earth. 27 The Soviet Constitution did not merely proclaim
these rights and freedoms but also created methods and guarantees for
their implementation. 28 By and large, however, the Soviet Constitution
provided class liberties and not individual liberties.2 9 These basic rights
of the citizens were comprehensive and served the interests of the entire
people. Thus, an individual could not use his liberties to the detriment
of the citizenry as a whole.23 0 The Constitution was proclaimed as the
fundamental law of the land, and all other laws had to conform to
its provisions.3 ' The Constitution could only be amended by a majority
of not less than two-thirds of the votes of each chamber of the Supreme
Soviet of the USSR.2 32
225. See Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment. 21 Am.
Crim. L. Rev. 257 (1984).
226. The criminal justice system and Constitution of the Soviet Union have undergone
many changes since 1917. However, for purposes of this comment, all laws and practices
of the Soviet Union regardless of their time period will be treated as indicative of the
police state. Generally, the picture of the Soviet Union is most indicative of the 1950s
and 1960s. The Soviet Union no longer exists. Though the police power was not the
sole cause of the collapse of the regime, the signs of a police state can be considered
symptomatic of a nation with deep internal infirmities, often fatal. See supra note II.
227. N. T. Vanamamalai, Law and Justice in the USSR 38 (1980) [hereinafter Van-
amamalail.
228. Id. at 43.
229. Roger N. Baldwin, Liberty Under the Soviets 17 (1928). According to the
Communist view, individual liberties arose as political issues in the Western struggle of
private capitalist enterprises against feudalism. The Communists note that individual
liberties took root only in western Europe, particularly England, France, and America.
230. Fundamentals of Soviet Law 92 (P. Romashkin ed. 1961) [hereinafter Ro-
mashkin].
231. Vanamamalai, supra note 227, at 9.
232. Romashkin, supra note 230, at 48.
1258 [Vol. 52
NOTES
The Soviet Court was the state organ charged with administering
socialist justice designed to protect against transgressions of the Soviet
system. The Procurator's Office was a special organ created to supervise
the precise and undeviating observance of the laws by all persons,
establishments, and organizations . 2  Whenever evidence was presented
which showed a criminal action or inaction, a criminal case was opened.2 34
The investigating magistrate then had the right to conduct a preliminary
examination. Usually, this magistrate was actually a procurator.2" The
law prescribed for the investigating magistrate to take all measures
provided by law for a thorough, complete and objective investigation
into all aspects of the case. The investigation was charged with bringing
forward all evidence, incriminating and exculpatory, as well as aggra-
vating and mitigating evidence. 36 However, no arrests, searches, seizures
or correspondences nor other similar actions could be undertaken with-
out the procurator's written authorization. 37 Even if a given search
was not authorized, the evidence discovered was nevertheless admissible
since the Soviet system favored the bringing forward of any evidence,
regardless of its source and acquisition. The court admitted and weighed
evidence according only to its own "inner conviction." 3 ' This was
justified by the belief that the court is charged with a duty to discover
the absolute, objective truth.2 39
If the preliminary investigation revealed the guilt of the accused,
it was the duty of the procurator to take any steps necessary to bring
the accused to trial. In court the procurator represented the State and
prosecuted the accused. The procurator had to prove the charges against
the accused and substantiate his proposed penalty for the criminal. 2
Although Soviet laws provided many procedural guarantees against
unjustified prosecutions, it is widely recognized that not every person
who was prosecuted was truly guilty. Nevertheless, the operative pre-
sumption was that only the guilty are brought to trial, and the court
need only assess the gravity of the crime.24'
In practice, the police, procurators, and courts often ignored es-
tablished legal standards. According to Stanislaw Pomorski:
233. Id. at 89, 91.
234. Samuel Kucherov, The Organs of Soviet Administration of Justice: Their History
and Operation 379 (1970) [hereinafter Kucherov]. Precisely whai quantum is needed to
open a case is not defined by law. However, it is clear that complete certainty of crimirial
activity is not required.
235. Id. at 381.
236. Id. at 400.
237. Vanamamalai, supra note 227, at 161.
238. Kucherov, supra note 234, at 598.
239. Id. at 600.
240. Romashkin, supra note 230, at 91.
241. Robert Conquest, Justice and the Legal System in the USSR 57 (1968).
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The tension between broadly understood political expediency
and legality have more often than not been resolved in favor
of the former. This has happened on a massive scale during
fairly regularly launched anticrime campaigns or any other "anti"
campaign with repressive overtones .... Consequently, during
campaigns, the party apparatus and the police overshadow reg-
ular agencies of prosecution and adjudication and usurp part
of their powers. 42
The judiciary quickly became entirely subservient to the police and
procurators. Criminal trials were little more than "uncritical, mostly
ritualistic, rehearsals of the police file." 2 ' The Soviet criminal justice
system gained a very strong prosecutorial bias and was "prone to
victimize individuals dragged into its wheels." 244 The abuses of the
system are well known:
For years numerous Soviet citizens suffered mistreatment, false
accusations, convictions on fabricated charges, and long im-
prisonment at the hands of the overzealous or corrupt operators
of the criminal process. At the same time the powerful, the
influential, the "well connected" enjoyed virtual immunity from
arrest, prosecution, and punishment. There have been several
reported . . . cases of innocent people condemned to death and
executed .2'
Despite the enormous protections written into the Soviet Constitution,
they provided little protection from the abuses of the police and State
after the liberties had been sacrificed for the "good of the whole."
Several frightening comparisons can be made to the recent trends
in American criminal justice. First, the Soviet Constitution shows the
meaninglessness of grand words when they are ignored by the courts.
The Soviet Constitution promised a tremendous array of personal lib-
erties yet delivered relatively few. Instead, the liberties were withdrawn
to ease the prosecution of criminals. The current Court has likewise
been stripping the Bill of Rights of any meaning, one case at a time.
Acevedo removes the Fourth Amendment's meaning and application
from automobiles, which is a vital part of American society. Second,
in the Soviet Union, the legality of searches was essentially under
executive control. The judiciary merely rubberstamped the procurator's
242. Stanislaw Pomorski, Communists and Their Criminal Law Revisited. 14 Law &
Soc. Inquiry 581, 587-88 (1989).
243. Id. at 595.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 594.
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investigations. 2" Acevedo has placed the search of automobiles under
executive control, with the courts relegated to a mere review of the
police officer's determination of probable cause, which itself is subject
to a decreasing quantum. Third, in both the Soviet Union and, now,
the United States the balance in favor of the procurators and police
is justified by an attack on criminals.
The real targets of the unregulated police power in the Soviet Union
were political dissidents and anti-Soviet thinkers such as entrepreneurs
and pacifists. Acevedo cracks down on drug dealers and possessors.
But the erosion of individual rights-through the dereliction of the Bill
of Rights-affects everyone. The Constitution cannot be eviscerated
only for criminals. Weakened protection for criminals is weakened
protection for all. 47 The average citizen may not realize this because
he feels immune or removed from the immediate crackdown. He may
think: "Only criminals are hurt. I am not a criminal. So what? 2 48 He
would be wise to understand that the rule of Acevedo will adversely
affect anyone who the police have suspicion to believe is a criminal.
Further, we should take no consolation in the fact that the police may
predictably employ the warrantless search only upon certain "target
groups" of American society.249
246. The Soviet Union never embraced a separation of powers doctrine, but did
acknowledge that a division of labor has many advantages.
247. Rex D. Davis, Federal Searches and Seizures, at vii-viii (1964) ("Every citizen
has a vital interest in preserving a reasonable relationship between individual liberties
and law enforcement in view of the intolerable alternatives which are possible."). Sadly,
the abuses of imbalance can be seen quite clearly in other locales. See John Dugard,
The Judiciary in a State of National Crisis-With Special Reference to the South African
Experience, 44 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 477 (1987).
248. Such wide-spread apathy is not surprising given the results of a recent poll of
507 Americans. Only 9% knew that the Bill of Rights had been added to the Constitution
to limit abuses by the federal government. Bill of Rights Unfamiliar to Many in U.S.,
Baton Rouge Morning Advocate, Dec. 15, 1991, at A2, col.2. Richard Lacayo, speaking
of the Rodney King beating, observed an intentional ignorance of middle and upper
class Americans: "Los Angeles is far from the only place where police play hardball.
dispensing curbside justice with disturbing regularity, especially in crime-plagued ghetto
neighborhoods and to people whose only offense is the color of their skins. Those who
live outside such areas can usually ignore that reality. Fed up with violent street crime,
they are often content to send in the police force and demand that it do whatever is
necessary while they look the other way." Richard Lacayo, Law and Disorder, Time,
April I , 1991, at 18, 19.
249. This practice is, of course, reprehensible. One would wish such uneven police
work did not occur, but scholarly evidence suggests that the police have intentionally
targeted specific minority groups and willfully abused their police discretion, at least in
urban areas. See Frank Donner, Protectors of Privilege: Red Squads and Police Repression
in Urban America (1990); Ted Gest, Why Brutality Persists, U.S. News & World Report,
April I, 1991, at 24 ("It is clear that indefensible brutalities-most of them inflicted
on powerless minority victims-still take place too frequently in inner cities.").
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This comment does not mean to suggest that the American criminal
justice system is the equivalent of the Soviet police state. However, the
trend of the Court, as shown in Acevedo, has been to gradually trans-
form our criminal justice system such that it begins to resemble a police
state more and more. If it walks like a duck and talks like a duck,
then it may very well be a duck. Acevedo gives the Court webbed feet
upon which to continue the ominous march of a loyal footsoldier in
the "War on Drugs." The Court has adopted measures which other
nations have tried before and which have resulted in repression and
revolution. Judge Alex Kozinski of the United States Court of Appeals
of the Ninth Circuit has stated the danger well:
Few people, it seems, have acknowledged a connection between
what's happening in Eastern Europe and what's going on here.
To paraphrase President Kennedy, we should ask not what
Eastern Europe can learn from us, but what we can learn from
Eastern Europe. Once burned, the people of Eastern Europe
are not likely to fall prey to the notion that all things can be
achieved if only government gets involved. The question is, are
we going to pay heed, or are we destined to make some of
the same mistakes with some of the same consequences?250
The people of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union have realized that
it is far better for some criminals to go free than for the State to have
unrestrained power over its citizens. In fact, the new proposed Con-
stitution of the Russian Republic strongly protects the home and man-
dates that only a court may issue a search warrant.2"'
V. CONCLUStON
A balance must be struck between the liberty of the individual, on
one hand, and society's need for law, on the other. Cicero said that
we are all in bondage to the law in order that we may be free. 2 ' A
society without law or without effective law enforcement is an anarchy.
A society without individual liberty is a tyrannous police state. America's
250. Other Comments, Forbes, Oct. 14, 1991, at 30. Judge Kozinski was speaking
primarily about economic control used by government. However, his general observation
is equally applicable to the political and social control used by the government, i.e., the
police.
251. Article 2.3.4. of the proposed constitution of the Russian Republic provides:
I. Home is sacred. Nobody has the right to search a home against the will
of its residents or to violate the sanctity of the dwelling. It may be done only
in cases prescribed by law.
2. The search warrant is issued upon the decision of the court.
252. Pro Cluentio 53. See Cicero: The Speeches 378, 379 (G. Hodge trans., 1927)
("... legum denique idcirco omnes servi sumus, ut liberi esse possimus.").
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Founding Fathers had first-hand experience with both extremes of so-
ciety. The frontier approximated anarchy, and the writs of assistance
of the Crown approximated tyranny. Knowing the abuses and dangers
of each extreme, the Founding Fathers struck a delicate balance em-
bodied in the Fourth Amendment. The individual was to be predom-
inantly free from police searches. However, the government could intrude
upon the individual's privacy when such would be reasonable, primarily
shown by a warrant supported by probable cause. In this original
balance, the individual was paramount. Nonetheless, society's need for
effective law enforcement would justify a search or seizure of the
individual or his property when the police (executive branch) acted with
the magistrate (judicial branch). The magistrate was in turn constrained
by the requirement of probable cause. "
The current Supreme Court, through Acevedo and other cases, is
trying to strike a new balance which strongly favors law enforcement,
that is, state control, over the individual. As far as automobiles are
concerned, the police no longer must act with the magistrate. This
departure from the wisdom of the Founding Fathers is extremely dan-
gerous and threatens to destroy many of the virtues of American society.
The United States was built upon the notion that individual freedom
is paramount; it is at the core of democratic politics and the free-
market economy. Acevedo is not alone the ruination of the United
States, but it reflects a recent trend towards stronger governmental
control over the individual. A seduction is comprised of many innocuous
acts-a glance, a smile, a friendly hug, a kiss on the cheek. One wonders
if the Court has already irreversibly compromised the Fourth Amend-
ment to the debaucher Tyranny. Over a century ago Justice Bradley
warned:
It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least
repulsive form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices
get their first footing in that way, namely, by silent approaches
and slight deviations . . . . It is the duty of the courts to be
watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against
any stealthy encroachment thereon. Their motto should be obsta
principiis.54
253. Many years ago the Supreme Court explained:
The right to privacy was deemed too precious to entrust to the discretion of
those whose job is the detection of crime and the arrest of criminals. Power
is a heady thing; and history shows that the police acting on their own cannot
be trusted. And so the Constitution requires a magistrate to pass on the desires
of the police ....
McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-56, 69 S. Ct. 191, 193 (1948).
254. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635, 6 S. Ct. 524, 535 (1886). Obsta
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The Supreme Court has failed in this duty. Moreover, the current
conservative dominance of the Court makes it very unlikely that the
Court will correct its errors soon. Therefore, some other power must
try to restore the original balance of the Fourth Amendment.
Neither the executive branch nor Congress are likely candidates.
The executive has been the leader of the Court in its war on crime
and drugs which has led to decisions like Acevedo. Congress too has
been generally supportive of the war on crime and drugs. Moreover,
Congress is particularly sensitive to the political machinations of special
interest groups and the public outcry against crime. Few congressmen
could afford to risk appearing to be pro-crime or pro-drugs. The
executive and legislative branches of state governments are also subject
to similar concerns.
Therefore, it is the state courts which must restore and maintain
a sensible balance between the individual and law enforcement. Esteemed
commentators of all backgrounds have recognized the crucial importance
of state courts willing to support individual rights in the face of federal
retrenchment. Justice Brennan pleaded that the decisions of the Supreme
Court should not be dispositive of questions involving individual rights
which are also guaranteed by the provisions of state law. The Court's
decisions may be persuasive but should be carefully scrutinized, by
practitioners as well as state judges."' He concluded:
Adopting the premise that state courts can be trusted to
safeguard individual rights, the Supreme Court has gone on to
limit the protective role of the federal judiciary .... Yet, the
very premise of the cases that foreclose federal remedies con-
stitutes a clear call to state courts to step into the breach. With
the federal locus of our double protections weakened, our lib-
erties cannot survive if the states betray the trust the Court has
put in them .... With federal scrutiny diminished, state courts
must respond by increasing their own.23 6
From perhaps a different perspective, Judge Bork has written that the
"limitation of national power to preserve a large degree of autonomy
in the states ... [has] guaranteed our liberties as much as, perhaps
more than, the Bill of Rights itself." 2" Today, the Bill of Rights is
being interpreted into oblivion, necessitating an immediate and cou-
principiis roughly means to "nip it in the bud." In Remedia Amoris Ovid advises us
to literally "resist the beginnings" of problems, difficulties, and evil before they grow
and develop into major problems. See Eugene Ehrlich, Dictionary of Latin Tags and
Phrases 165 (1987).
255. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 489, 502 (1977).
256. Id. at 502-03.
257. Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America 4 (1989).
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rageous move by the high courts of every state to reclaim the torch
of liberty.
Up to now, every state has basically followed the lead of the
Supreme Court regarding search and seizure law. However, each state
has a constitutional provision which can be used as a point of departure
from the Court's recent jurisprudence. For example, Article 1, Section
5, of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, prohibits "unreasonable
searches, seizures, and invasions of privacy" by governmental agents.
Usually the Louisiana Supreme Court has interpreted this provision to
parallel the interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. Nevertheless, on
occasion the Louisiana Supreme Court has rejected the lead of the
United States Supreme Court. For example, in State v. Church,15 the
supreme court refused to accept the "reasonableness" of allowing D.W.I.
roadblocks. In State v. Hernandez,259 the Louisiana Supreme Court
departed from the implications of New York v. Belton26° allowing the
warrantless search of the entire interior of an automobile incident to
an arrest. Justice Dennis explained the basis for the divergence:
We, of course, give careful consideration to the United States
Supreme Court interpretations of relevant provisions of the
federal constitution, but we cannot and should not allow those
decisions to replace our independent judgment in construing the
constitution adopted by the people of Louisiana. . . . Our state
constitution's declaration of the right to privacy contains an
affirmative establishment of a right of privacy, explicit protec-
tions against unreasonable searches, seizures or invasions of
property and communications, as well as houses, papers and
effects, and gives standing to any person adversely affected by
a violation of these safeguards to raise the illegality in the
courts.... This constitutional declaration of right is not a
duplicate of the Fourth Amendment or merely coextensive with
it; it is one of the most conspicuous instances in which our
citizens have chosen a higher standard of individual liberty than
that afforded by the jurisprudence interpreting the federal con-
stitution.262
Justice Dennis was entirely correct. In Acevedo, the Supreme Court
has discarded the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment. The
highest courts of the fifty states should similarly discard the recent
decisions of the Court if they value individual liberty. There is no other
258. 538 So. 2d 993 (La. 1989).
259. 410 So. 2d 1381 (La. 1982).
260. 453 U.S. 454, 101 S. Ct. 2860 (1981).
261. Hernandez, 410 So. 2d at 1385.
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peaceful way to restore the balance between the citizen and the police.2 62
John Michael Harlow
262. One basic question still remains: is the Bill of Rights worth fighting for? Are
the principles and balances struck by the Founding Fathers still valuable today in the
face of rampant crime and drug abuse? Arthur Selwyn Miller has offered an interesting,
provocative, and different Machiavellian perspective. According to Miller, the written
Constitution has been inadequate to face even mild crises when the government has
consequently grasped for raw power. He writes:
Constitutionalism to many is the glory of the American experience. With ups
and downs and some unacknowledged changes, the original Constitution of
1787 has survived-but only because of extraconstitutional adjustments that
were made to meet the various exigencies of successive generations. ...
The theory of American constitutionalism has, therefore, long been askew
with the facts of American life. Unless major changes are made, that gap will
be even more pronounced in the future. Constitutionalism, as Madison and
others have defined it, is dying, gasping out its life as the waves of repeated
crises roll over and inundate the traditional political and legal order. Govern-
ment, always as strong as circumstances required, will in the future become
even stronger. The idea of limited government is giving way to one of bur-
geoning powers. The facade remains as a legal Potemkin Village; but lurking
behind the false front will be the reality of authoritarianism.
Arthur S. Miller, Democratic Dictatorship: the Emergent Constitution of Control 231-
32 (1981). Hopefully, Miller's prophecy is not coming true before our very eyes, though
Acevedo is strong evidence of it. For another view of the Supreme Court's modification
of the Constitution, see Paul L. Murphy, The Constitution in Crisis Times: 1918-69
(1972).
